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Archive for the ‘Class Action Decisions’ Category

The Supreme Court issued its decision today in the first of two arbitration-related class action cases on the 2012-13 docket.  Today’s decision bucks what had been a trend in the Court’s decisions in recent years strongly favoring individual arbitration and limiting the situations in which class arbitration (private arbitration in which the plaintiffs proceed in a representative capacity on behalf of a class) can occur.

In a unanimous ruling, the Court in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter upheld an arbitrator’s decision to interpret an arbitration agreement as allowing for class arbitration, despite express reference to class arbitration in the parties’ written agreement.  Writing for the Court, Justice Kagan reasoned that applicable standard of review prevents the courts from second-guessing whether the arbitrator’s interpretation of the party’s contract was the correct one and only permits review of whether the decision was based on an interpretation of the parties’ agreement.  Because the arbitrator’s decision was clearly based on an analysis of contractual intent, the arbitrator’s decision could not be overturned.  The fact that the arbitrator had interpreted the parties’ agreement as providing for class arbitration and the deferential standard applicable to the arbitrator’s decision distinguished Oxford Health Plans from Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., in which the Court had held that class arbitration cannot be compelled absent express agreement by the parties.

Important to the Court’s decision was the fact that the defendant had conceded that the arbitrator should decide the question of whether the parties had agreed to class arbitration.  It was this concession that let Justice Alito to agree with the Court’s decision.  However, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Alito expressed doubt that any ruling in the class arbitration proceeding would have any preclusive effect as to absent class members, an observation that raises a serious question about whether the Oxford Health decision will be of any practical impact in other cases.  He noted:

Class arbitrations that are vulnerable to collateral attack allow absent class members to unfairly claim the “benefit from a favorable judgment without subjecting themselves to the binding effect of an unfavorable one,” American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 546– 547 (1974).  In the absence of concessions like Oxford’s, this possibility should give courts pause before concluding that the availability of class arbitration is a question the arbitrator should decide.

Defendants will likely see the concurrence as a roadmap for asking the question to be addressed by a court in the first instance, as opposed to simply conceding that the arbitrator should decide the issue whether class arbitration is allowed. 

There are two clear takeaways from the Oxford Health decision: 1) in drafting an arbitration provision, make sure to address the issue of whether arbitration on a class-wide basis will be allowed.  Under Stolt-Nielsen, agreements that bar class arbitration will be enforced; 2) think carefully before conceding that an arbitrator, rather than a court, should make decisions about how an arbitration agreement should be interpreted.

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My sincere apologies to the loyal ClassActionBlawg reader for the scarcity of new content lately. I’m on the road this week, but thought I should at least drop a note about two interesting class-action-related developments in the U.S. Supreme Court over the past week:

1) the Court granted cert in  State of Mississippi v. AU Optronics Corp., to address the issue whether parens patriae actions filed by state attorneys general seeking restitution on behalf of state citizens are “mass” actions, permitting removal under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).  For more on the case, see Deborah Renner’s post on the BakerHostetler Class Action Lawsuit Defense Blog.  If it were up to me, I’d go further and say that parens patriae cases are actually “class” actions under CAFA, but apparently the Court has its own idea about the scope of the issue.

2) The Court vacated Judge Richard Posner’s decision in Butler v. Sears Roebuck & Co. and remanded for reconsideration in light of its recent decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend.  This follows the Court’s earlier decision to vacate the Sixth Circuit’s decision in In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Products Liability Litigation for the same reason.  Given the many questions left unanswered by the Comcast decision, it will be interesting to see what the Sixth and Seventh Circuits do with the moldy washer cases on remand.

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Work commitments have prevented me from posting over the past week, but I wanted to take the opportunity to point out that there have been some notable developments in the privacy class action area over the past week.  Judy Selby covered these developments in a recent blog post for the BakerHostetler Class Action Defense and Data Privacy Monitor blogs.  Selby’s post, titled Hannaford v. comScore – Up and Down Results for Privacy Class Action Defendants, compares and contrasts two recent decisions, one granting and one denying class certification, in privacy cases.

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The United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, No. 11-864 today.  In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the class of cable subscribers had been improperly certified.  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reasoned that the expert testimony offered by the plaintiff to show that antitrust damages were capable of class-wide proof addressed alleged damages that did not logically flow from the plaintiff’s theory of class-wide liability.  The majority held that the trial court had erred by refusing to consider questions concerning the expert testimony on damages that might overlap with the “merits,” while the Third Circuit had erred by accepting the plaintiffs’ contention that it had a class-wide theory of damages through expert testimony without actually scrutinizing the factual basis for that contention:

The Court of Appeals simply concluded that respondents “provided a method to measure and quantify damages on a classwide basis,” finding it unnecessary to decide “whether the methodology [was] a just and reasonable inference or speculative.” 655 F. 3d, at 206.  Under that logic, at the class-certification stage any method of measurement is acceptable so long as it can be applied classwide, no matter how arbitrary the measurements may be.  Such a proposition would reduce Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement to a nullity.

The dissenting Justices would have dismissed the writ of certiorari as having been improvidently granted.  The dissent’s criticism of the majority’s holding has more to do with the procedural posture of the case and the methodology used by the majority in reaching its factual conclusions than with the legal class certification concepts underlying the majority’s reasoning.  In particular, the dissent faulted the majority for having changed the issue on review after the conclusion of briefing and took issue with the majority’s analysis of the factual basis for the expert’s opinions.

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The Supreme Court issued its first-ever decision interpreting the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) today, and its holding strengthens defendants’ right to a federal forum in class actions. 

The question presented in Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles, No. 11-1450, slip op. (U.S., Mar. 19, 2012) was a simple one: can a plaintiff avoid federal jurisdiction under CAFA by stipulating to less than $5 million in damages on behalf of the putative class?  The Court’s unanimous answer was no, and its reasoning is also simple:

Stipulations must be binding . . . [and] a plaintiff who files a proposed class action cannot legally bind members of the proposed class before the class is certified.

Slip op. at 3-4.  

Does Standard Fire mean the end of any debate about the federal courts as a forum for class actions?  Probably not.  Justice Breyer’s well-reasoned opinion makes the issue sound like a no-brainer, but this is an issue that had been far from settled in the lower courts.  The fact that the Supreme Court had to intervene on this issue is in part a symptom of a lingering antagonism by many lower federal court judges toward diversity jurisdiction.  The ruling is unlikely to change the predisposition of some federal judges to look for ways to clear their dockets by remanding diversity cases to the state courts.  Although the effectiveness of this particular method for avoiding CAFA jurisdiction is now settled in defendants’ favor, that is not to say that other tactics for avoiding federal jurisdiction in class actions won’t succeed in the future.

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The Supreme Court has issued its opinion in one of the most highly anticipated class action-related cases on the docket this term.  The result in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, No. 11-1085, slip op. (U.S., Feb. 27, 2013) is not surprising given the content and tone of the questioning at oral argument.  In an 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Ginsberg, the Court held that the plaintiff in a securities fraud case based on a fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance does not have to prove materiality of the fraudulent statement or omission at the class certification stage.  Because materiality is a common question capable of resolution simultaneously for the entire class, the majority reasoned, it does not have to be proven at the class certification stage.  Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy dissented.

Amgen is an important decision in the securities fraud context because it addresses the lingering question of whether any special prerequisites exist in certifying a securities fraud class action that aren’t required in certifying other types of class actions.  Like the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011), Amgen will probably have an impact beyond the securities fraud context.  In the context of class certification decisions more broadly, the opinion will be almost certainly be cited as clarifying the distinction between issues impacting the elements of class certification, which must be resolved at the class certification phase, and merits issues, which can wait until trial to be resolved.

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling yesterday that will be a blow to plaintiffs seeking to sue call centers in class actions for violations of California’s Invasion of Privacy Law, Cal. Penal Code § 632 (sometimes called the “wiretapping” statute).  The law prohibits the recording or monitoring of confidential telephone calls without the caller’s consent.  It is an appealing basis for class action claims because it provides for statutory penalty of $5,000 per violation, creating the possibility of annihilating exposure in a case that involves a call center that handles thousands of customer calls.

In Faulkner v. ADT Security Services, Inc., the court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of a claim under the statute based on allegations that a call center for a security company recorded the call of a customer who called with a billing dispute.  The Ninth Circuit fell short of holding that a billing dispute with a security company could never qualify as a “confidential” communication giving rise to liability under the law, but it did observe that whether a particular call was confidential would require unique facts:

For example, a caller might be asked to verify his identity by confirming his social security number or his unlisted telephone number, or to disclose other private or potentially private information. If adequately pled, such facts might well support a finding of confidentiality.

Slip op. at 9, n.***.  The need to examine the particular content of each call to determine whether liability is present would in most cases create an individualized issue of fact preventing class certification.  So, although the ruling does not close the door on claims against call centers for violations of the Invasion of Privacy law, it presents a hurdle to the certification of potentially bankrupting class actions.

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My partner, Bob Abrams, sent me a copy of the order granting Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Class Certification in Allen v. Dairy Farmers of America, an antitrust class action brought on behalf of dairy farmers alleging monopolization and a conspiracy to fix milk prices by various milk cooperatives and processors.  Abrams’ team has been appointed as class counsel for one of the subclasses certified as part of the order. 

The opinion includes an interesting analysis of at least two important issues: First, the extent to which intra-class conflicts of interest can prevent class certification and the extent to which the creation of subclasses can remedy those conflicts; and Second, the extent to which a defendant can avoid class certification in an antitrust case by pointing out alleged flaws in the plaintiffs’ expert’s opinion that a common, class-wide antitrust injury exists or by presenting conflicting expert testimony.  The second issue is one that may be clarified when the Supreme Court rules later this term on Comcast v. Behrend.

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This is the second of what will be six posts summarizing my notes of the six presentations at the ABA’s 16th Annual Class Actions Institute held last month in Chicago.  For more on this excellent conference, see this October 31, 2012 CAB Post.

Session 2 addressed a topic of great relevance to all class action practitioners, regardless of the subject matter area of practice.  It was entitled “The Class Definition That Works . . . or Does It?” Strategies for Pleading and Attacking Class Definitions;  The Most Basic and Most Ignored Step in a Class-Action Lawsuits Success or Failure.  The panel of academics, judges and practitioners discussed recent developments in the state and federal courts regarding the requirements for a class definition.  They also discussed practical tips for plaintiffs in articulating a class definition that will withstand attack at the class certification stage, and practical tips for defendants in defeating class certification by attacking the plaintiff’s choice of class definition.  Program Chair Daniel R. Karon moderated the panel discussion, which consisted of The Honorable James G. Carr, Bart D. Cohen, Donald Frederico, Professor Dean Robert Klonoff, Sabrina H. Strong, and Ranae D. Steiner. 

Here are some highlights of the pointers made by the panel during the presentation:

  • Many courts have accepted several additional elements as implicit under Rule 23 and similar state rules of civil procedure, including that the class definition be sufficiently clear and narrow so that the class is ascertainable and not overly broad.  These requirements are implied in order to ensure 1) that the class can be identified from a practical perspective; 2) that the defendant has notice of the claims being made against it and by whom those claims are being made; and 3) that the court can manage the litigation.
  • These issues can also be expressed through the other, express Rule 23 elements.  For example, if a class is not ascertainable, then there is no basis to conclude that numerosity is present.  Similarly, an inability to distinguish class members who have a claim from those who do not should lead the court to conclude that common issues do not predominate.
  • Many trial judges would prefer to consider issues relating to the class definition in terms of the express Rule 23 elements rather than by accepting addition, implicit requirements.
  • Rather than declining to certify altogether, courts are often willing to work with plaintiffs’ counsel to try to come up with alternative class definitions that resolve problems associated with a class as originally proposed.
  • Because most judges are not dealing with these types of issues on a daily basis, the involvement of counsel on both sides is essential to the judge’s well-reasoned evaluation of the potential legal and practical problems with the proposed class definition and whether those problems can be remedied without violating the rights of the defendant or absent class members or overburdening the court.

The panel grouped issues relating to class definitions into various categories.  The panel discussed each of these categories in reference to an example case.  In many instances, the categories overlap, and the example cases often illustrated more than one of the categories.  I have listed below, for each category, the key problems, the example case(s) discussed by the panel, and my notes on insights offered by panelists:

Lack of objective criteria for class membership

Issue – Membership in the class depends on criteria that cannot be established without looking at each class member individually.

Example -  Solo v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., MDL No. 1785, 2009 WL 4287706 (D.S.C. Sept. 25, 2009):  In class action seeking compensation for the lost value of tainted contact lens solution that purchasers were encouraged to dump out as part of a product recall, class defined as consisting of all purchasers who “lack[ed] full reimbursement” for the value of the solution purchased.

Notes - fixes proposed by panel members included 1) Expand definition to remove individualized issues, e.g. “all who purchased”, but this could create overbreadth problems; 2) create subclasses based on date of purchase, and estimate likely amount of consumption for members in each subclass.

Vagueness

Issue – The class definition is too vague and indefinite to determine who is in the class.

ExampleHeisler v. Maxtor Corp., No. 5:06-cv-06634, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125745 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2010): Class defined as anyone who experienced a hard drive “failure.”  The problem was determining what constituted a “failure” and limiting that phrase to failures caused by the alleged product defect. 

Notes - The Maxtor case provides an example of a decision where the court preferred to characterize the issues in relation to the express Rule 23 requirements.  The case also illustrates a common problem in cases where causation may be an issue.  By trying to limit class membership to only those individuals who suffered harm, the plaintiffs created a vagueness problem.

Failsafe Class

Issue - Class definition includes only those individuals who will ultimately prove their claims on the merits, so that class membership is not determined until a decision on the merits occurs.  The main problem with failsafe class is that it puts the defendant in a lose-lose situation.  Either the class wins at trial, binding the defendant to a classwide judgment, or the defendant prevails but gets no preclusive effect against absent class members.

ExampleNudell v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2002 WL 1543725 (D.N.D. 2002): The court denied certification after determining that class membership hinged on class members’ ability to prove all of the factual issues that would prove their claims on the merits, including that they owned land abutting a railroad easement, that they did not give consent to the placement of utility cables on the easement, and so on. 

Notes - The problem in Nudell may have been due to a failure to develop the record sufficiently to convince the court that class membership could be determined based on objective criteria.  This is an example of a case where problems with the class definition could be remedied.  The case ultimately settled on a classwide basis after the class was re-defined.

Overbreadth

Problem – Class includes members who did not suffer injury or who have no legal right to recover.

ExamplesSanders v. Apple Inc., 672 F. Supp. 2d 978 (N.D. Cal. 2009): In action for deceptive advertising, class definition included all persons who ”own” a 20-inch iMac.  The court found this definition overly broad because it included individuals who didn’t purchase the product and those who weren’t deceived by the advertising.  Anderson v. United Fin. Sys. Corp., 281 F.R.D. 292 (N.D. Ohio 2012): Class was found to be overly broad because it included class members whose claims were time-barred and who had no private right of action.

Notes - In some cases, overbreadth can be cured simply by narrowing the class definition.  On others, however, overbreadth is a symptom of predominance issues that may be difficult to remedy.

Class Definitions in Class Action Settlements

The panel also discussed issues in class definition within the settlement context.  As is true with other threshold requirements, the courts are generally more lenient about class definitions in the settlement context than they are in the litigation context, in large part because manageability concerns are lessened when otherwise contested issues do not have to be resolved.  An example is the DeBeers diamond settlement, Sullivan v. D.B. Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011), where the Third Circuit affirmed certification of a settlement class over objections claiming that some of the class members would not have had a private right of action due to variations in state law.  Whether the inclusion of class members whose claims are barred or significantly weaker than other class members should be a bar to certification of a settlement class probably depends on whether other class members will suffer as a result.  If it’s simply a matter of the defendant agreeing to waive defenses as to a portion of the class, then courts are more likely to overlook variations in the strengths and weaknesses of individual class members’ claims.

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Tiger Joyce, President of the American Tort Reform Association, authored an impassioned op-ed for the Washington Times yesterday entitled A Class-action Blow to U.S. Manufacturing.  Joyce argues that the entire manufacturing industry is at risk if the United States Supreme Court declines to grant certiorari of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in the case of Whirlpool v. Glazer, No. 12-322, in which the court upheld class certification of claims that washing machines were defectively designed, causing chronic mold problems.  Whether Joyce’s warning is hyperbole or prescience remains to be seen, but the case does raise some interesting issues of note to class action practitioners.  The issues presented for review are as follows:

1. Whether a class may be certified under Rule 23(b)(3) even though most class members have not been harmed and could not sue on their own behalf.

2. Whether a class may be certified without resolving factual disputes that bear directly on the requirements of Rule 23.

3. Whether a class may be certified without determining whether factual dissimilarities among putative class members give rise to individualized issues that predominate over any common issues.

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