Earlier today, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in two highly anticipated appeals of decisions by the Sixth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals to grant class certification over breach of warranty claims involving allegedly defective washing machines. The denial of cert in Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Nos. 11-8029, 12-8030 (7th Cir., Aug. 22, 2013) (Posner, J.) and In re Front‐Loading Washer Products Liability Litigation, No. 10-4188 (6th Cir. July 18, 2013) was a surprise to many commentators who had seen the moldy washer cases as providing the perfect opportunity for the Court to continue its trend clarifying the boundaries of class certification in cases like Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend. The denial of cert means that the Court will not be addressing the question of whether it is appropriate for a federal court to order class certification of discrete, common issues in a case without analyzing whether those issues predominate more generally over the individualized questions, like injury or damages. That question will be left to the lower courts for the time being.
Archive for the ‘class action reform’ Category
Posted in Class Action Decisions, Class Action News, class action reform, Class Action Trends, Supreme Court Decisions, tagged amgen, class action, class certification, comcast, commonality, dukes, issue certificeation, moldy, moldy washer, moldy washing machine, posner, predominance, sears, whirlpool on February 24, 2014 | Leave a Comment »
On Monday, I summarized proposed Arizona class action reform legislation forwarded to me by Shawn Aiken of Aiken Schenk Hawkins & Ricciardi P.C. Yesterday, Aiken forwarded the final version of the class action bill as introduced before the Arizona Senate.
Aiken also noted that there could be challenges to the legislative power to enact a new class action rule:
Our state constitution has many unique provisions. The one that will be invoked here is this: “The supreme court shall have . . . [the] [p]ower to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any court.” Arizona Constitution, Article 6, Section 5. The question will be what is more procedural than judicial certification of class actions?
Posted in class action reform, tagged aiken, arizona, arizona class action, causation, class action, class action appeal, class action notice, class certification, financial consequences, phoenix, proportionality, reliance, superiority on February 4, 2013 | 2 Comments »
Phoenix Attorney Shawn Aiken sent me an advance copy of a draft class action bill set to be introduced in the Arizona legislature this week. The bill sets forth some specific requirements for class certification that are much more exacting than those required under federal Rule 23 and most state class action rules. Some of the highlights are summarized below. Click this link for a complete copy of the bill.
- clear and convincing evidence would be required to justify a grant of class certification
- orders granting class certification would have to be supported by a detailed written statement of the reasons and evidence justifying the decision
- in assessing superiority, the court would be required to consider, among other things, ”whether it is probable that the amount which may be recovered by individual class members will be large enough in relation to the expense and effort of administering the action to justify maintaining the case as a class action”
- there would be a rebuttable presumption against class certification in cases involving claims where individual knowledge, causation, and reliance are required elements
- certification of a case as a class action would not relieve any class member of the requirement of proving individual injury or damages
- class notice must include a statement of ”the possible financial consequences for the class”
- the law would expressly provide that the plaintiff would bear the initial cost of distributing notice to the class
- appeals from orders granting or denying class certification could be taken as a matter of right the same as a final judgment, and trial court proceedings would be automatically stayed pending the appeal
Posted in Antitrust Class Actions, class action reform, Mass Tort, tagged allocation, anti-trust, antitrust, cartel, case management, common fund, competition, costs, eddy, esades, exclusion, fees, free rider, free-riding, geoffrey miller, geoffrey parsons miller, mdl, opt out, rosenthal, saveri on November 19, 2012 | Leave a Comment »
This is the fourth of what will be six posts summarizing my notes of the six presentations at the ABA’s 16th Annual Class Actions Institute held last month in Chicago. For more on this excellent conference, see my October 31, November 5, and November 6 CAB posts.
The fourth session was entitled “Sifting Through All the Big Shoulders,” Litigating Class Actions Alongside Opt-Outs – Free-Riding or Riding Shotgun. Vincent J. Esades moderated another distinguished panel, which included Professor Geoffrey Parsons Miller, The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, and attorneys Joseph R. Saveri and David C. Eddy.
Managing parallel class and opt out cases in multidistrict litigation is an increasingly common and complicated venture, especially in antitrust litigation, where individual institutional plaintiffs may have a sufficient enough individual stake to justify hiring their own counsel and pursue their own claims. A potential free-rider problem arises in this context because individual plaintiffs have a right under Rule 23(b)(3) to opt out of any class, at least for the purpose of pursuing damages claims. This means that individual plaintiffs and their lawyers can take advantage of the time and effort expended by the named plaintiffs and their counsel early on in the case, only to opt out later and pursue their own litigation without having to share the benefits of any recovery with class counsel.
The panelists seemed to agree that there is an inherent tension between the opt out rights embodied in Rule 23 and the burdens on the courts of managing both class and individual litigation over the same issue. They also seemed to agree that, short of re-writing Rule 23, there is no simple solution to ensure that the parties and attorneys who come late to litigation are not free riders on the efforts of others. Professor Miller raised the question whether these problems suggest a fundamental change is needed in how mass litigation occurs, including a convergence of mass tort and class actions or a recognition that those labels don’t mean anything in the context of certain multidistrict litigation. Alternatively, can existing rules of civil procedure could be used to solve the problem? Whether the solution to this problem is litigation reform, a change in judicial philosophy, or creative solutions already within existing rules, much of the discussion surrounded a very pragmatic question, “What’s the blueprint?”
The allocation of fees and costs between a class and individual plaintiffs raises a host of difficult questions, including 1) can a court force an opt-out to pay a portion of the fees of class counsel? 2) does a court have jurisdiction to require the defendant to pay any portion of any individual settlement with one or more plaintiffs into an escrow account, where a portion of any fee award can be claimed by the counsel for other plaintiffs, depending on the work performed? and 3) if allocation between counsel is somehow permitted, how should non-monetary aspects of settlements be valued, such as agreements to provide a guaranteed source of supply of a particular product?
The judge does, of course, have express case management authority under Rule 16 as well as more general inherent discretionary case management authority. However, the problem in using these case managemnt tools tends to be a lack of information about the precise problems that need to be resolved. Judge Rosenthal pointed out that the judge is typically not in a good position to make that decision without the help of the lawyers because there is usually very little information the economic incentives driving different groups of lawyers. (In what might have been the most quotable quip of the entire program, she implored the three lawyers on the panel, “How do I get you guys to lift up your skirts?”) If there is more transparency by the parties and their attorneys, she argued, a judge would be a better able to allocate costs fairly. Once the problems and incentives are identified, there are case management tools available to incentivize conduct properly, even if a judge does not have direct authority to order one party to pay another’s fees. For example, the judge can help parties to understand the benefits of coordination of efforts voluntarily.
One key question debated by the panelists was whether procedures used in mass tort litigation can be applied to the class action context. On one hand, as one panelist pointed out, the management of class and individual actions in a single MDL raises different challenges than the management of mass tort cases in an MDL. In the mass tort context, one panelist pointed out, all the parties and their attorneys have to be involved in the proceedings from the beginning because of the nature of mass torts as a collection of individual actions. In the class action context, by contrast, individual plaintiffs can wait and see how the class action proceedings develop before having to get involved individually through their own counsel. On the other hand, as with any complex litigation, there are models and protocols that both parties and judges to look to in order to bring efficiencies to the litigation even when not every problem can be solved. While mass tort litigation is not completely analogous it can provide a source of ideas for judicial management of certain problems.
In the end, the point was made that this is not so much an issue of jurisprudence as it is a problem of judicial management. As with any issue with case management, the solutions will develop over time through experience, trial, and error.
Posted in Class Action Decisions, class action reform, rule 23, Supreme Court Decisions, tagged class action, class certification, glazer, manufacturing, predominance, product liability, products liability, products liability class action, scotus, sixth circuit, Supreme Court, tort reform, whirlpool on October 9, 2012 | Leave a Comment »
Tiger Joyce, President of the American Tort Reform Association, authored an impassioned op-ed for the Washington Times yesterday entitled A Class-action Blow to U.S. Manufacturing. Joyce argues that the entire manufacturing industry is at risk if the United States Supreme Court declines to grant certiorari of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in the case of Whirlpool v. Glazer, No. 12-322, in which the court upheld class certification of claims that washing machines were defectively designed, causing chronic mold problems. Whether Joyce’s warning is hyperbole or prescience remains to be seen, but the case does raise some interesting issues of note to class action practitioners. The issues presented for review are as follows:
1. Whether a class may be certified under Rule 23(b)(3) even though most class members have not been harmed and could not sue on their own behalf.
2. Whether a class may be certified without resolving factual disputes that bear directly on the requirements of Rule 23.
3. Whether a class may be certified without determining whether factual dissimilarities among putative class members give rise to individualized issues that predominate over any common issues.
Posted in class action reform, Class Action Settlements, Data Privacy Class Actions, tagged class action, class action settlement, cy pres, data privacy, data privacy class action, dire straits, fee award, final approval, frankel, money for nothing, privacy class action, reuters, wolfman on September 17, 2012 | Leave a Comment »
Reuters contributor Alison Frankel authored an insightful column published August 20, 2012 entitled Foretelling the End of Money-for-Nothing Class Actions, that touches on issues similar to those raised by Brian Wolfman in two recent articles summarized in this August 15 CAB post. In her column, Frankel comments on a recent trend, particularly in data privacy class actions, where large fee awards are requested in settlements for which no meaningful relief is provided to class members. Oftentimes, the fee awards are justified by the value of prospective injunctive relief or by the fact of a large cash payment to charity in the form of a cy pres award, but not by any direct benefits to the class members themselves.
Frankel predicts that we have seen the “high point” in what she terms ”money-for-nothing” class action settlements, pointing to a growing skepticism among judges who are asked to approve them. While it remains to be seen if this prediction will come true, Frankel’s article, like Wolfman’s articles, should at least give pause to class action attorneys who are willing to sell out a class for personal gain: you may be getting away with this now, but at some point the courts will begin to look beyond the desire to clear their dockets and begin to question the societal value of these settlements.
Class Action Reform through Common Sense Constraints on Abuse by the Courts, Achievable Goal or Unattainable Utopia?
Posted in class action reform, Commentary, Other class action blogs, tagged class action, class action abuse, class action reform, class action settlement, costs award, easterbrook, frivolous, professionalism, public policy, sanction, settlement approval, wolfman on August 15, 2012 | 1 Comment »
Brian Wolfman, Co-director of the Institute for Public Representation at Georgetown University Law Center, has two excellent recent posts on Public Citizen’s Consumer Law and Policy Blog that provide food for thought on the need for class action reform, and the best way to achieve reform if it is needed.
In the most recent of the two articles, Paying the Lawyer’s Expenses in Class Actions, Wolfman discusses the social importance of allowing plaintiffs’ attorneys to recover their reasonable costs incurred in successfully pursuing a class action settlement or judgment, but discusses a recent case in which two attorneys from a prominent plaintiffs’ firm were sanctioned for having claimed reimbursement for fancy dinners and first class airline tickets. Wolfman warns about the negative impact that this type of conduct has on public perception of class actions, and makes the valuable point that even minor abuses of the system for personal gain threatens to bring scrutiny to the class action mechanism more generally, which limits access to justice that class actions may provide in meritorious cases.
In an earlier article, Important 7th Circuit Decision Rejecting Shareholder Derivative Suit, Wolfman applauds Judge Frank Easterbrook’s opinion throwing out the settlement of a shareholder derivative suit after finding that the underlying suit lacked merit and should be dismissed. Wolfman makes the point that rather than approving a settlement that provides little or no benefit to class members on the grounds that the merits of the claims are weak, the better solution from a public policy perspective is to dismiss the case entirely. He sums up this point concisely, “[a]n obviously meritless case should not benefit the lawyers and no one else.”
The two articles illustrate two important conceptual principles on which many consumer advocates and corporate interests may find themselves in complete agreement: First, it is the potential for abuse of class actions, and not the class action mechanism itself, that often provides the basis for legitimate criticism. Second, courts can preserve the fairness and integrity of class action mechanism without the need for systematic reform simply by applying common sense restraints in the face of clear abuse. I think that both of these points are correct as a matter of principle, and they are both eloquently illustrated by Wolfman’s posts.
My only question is whether the idea of preventing abuse through the application by the courts of common sense constraints, while pure in theory, is truly realistic in practice. It only works to the extent that all judges will act as carefully and thoughtfully as the judges in the two cases highlighted above. If courts do not dismiss all frivolous cases when a defendant files a motion to dismiss, what choice does a defendant have as a practical matter but to consider buying peace on the best terms possible, which often means paying off the lawyers at the expense of a class that the defendant doesn’t believe was harmed anyway? And, if some courts continue let frivolous claims proceed in the hopes that the parties will settle, or turn a blind eye to small excesses in fee and cost petitions, then basic human nature says that some (but certainly not all) plaintiffs’ lawyers will continue to commit these abuses, and some (but not all) defense lawyers will play along to serve their own interests. In the end, the cynic will question whether relying on the diligence and intellectual honesty of the judiciary and the professional integrity of the bar is a realistic path to reform.
On the other hand, for those of us who are practitioners and not policymakers, professional responsibility, appeal to reason, diligence, and intellectual honesty are the only tools we have at our disposal at maintaining the integrity of the judicial process.
Posted in class action reform, Class Action Trends, Practice Tips, tagged alternative dispute resolution, catalyst theory, class action alternative, class certification, faulkner, mass dispute resolution, refund program, rule 23, superiority, voigt, voluntary on August 2, 2012 | 1 Comment »
Professor Eric Voigt of the Jones School of Law at Faulkner University in Alabama has authored an intriguing article entitled A Company’s Voluntary Refund Program for Consumers Can Be a Fair and Efficient Alternative to a Class Action, 31 Review of Litigation 617 (University of Texas 2012). Voigt proposes that a company’s voluntary efforts in providing refunds to customers in consumer litigation can, in an appropriate case, be a more efficient means of providing collective redress than a class action settlement, which a court should take into account in conducting the superiority analysis required under Rule 23. Voigt argues that in evaluating superiority of a class action, non-judicial alternatives must be considered in addition to individual lawsuits. Therefore, he argues, a court must consider whether a company’s voluntary refund program is a more fair and efficient alternative to class action litigation. He also proposes various procedural and substantive features that should be included in any voluntary refund program to satisfy the requirement that it be a fair and efficient alternative to a class action. Voigt’s article is one of the first I have seen addressing this issue in detail, and I highly recommend it to practitioners, academics, judges, and policymakers alike.
As Voigt’s analysis suggests, even though it lacks the same preclusive effect as a class action settlement judgment, a voluntary refund program is something that a defendant may consider in attempting to avoid or defeat a class action in an appropriate case. Candidates for this strategy could include any case where the cost of providing direct relief to customers for 100% of damages that could be claimed in a lawsuit is outweighed by the cost of defending a potential class action combined with the likely cost of having to ultimately settle the case for some smaller amount. The strategy is far from failsafe because a voluntary refund program lacks the same preclusive effect as a class action settlement, and because a court’s evaluation of the superiority requirement is a matter of discretion. However, having done a voluntary refund program with the protections proposed in Voigt’s article can provide a strong basis to seek an early ruling not to certify any subsequent class action. Similarly, even when a class action lawsuit has already been filed, the prospect of doing a voluntary refund program can be used as leverage in bringing down an unreasonable settlement demand from plaintiff’s counsel. This is especially true in jurisdictions that do not recognize the “catalyst” theory (click link to read 2005 article on the topic by Professor Roy Simon) as a basis for the recovery of attorney’s fees.
Posted in Class Action Legislation, class action reform, Supreme Court Decisions, tagged class action, class action reform, commonality, delauro, disparate impact, dukes, employment class action, employment discrimination, equal employment, franken, group action, rule 23, scalia, wal-mart on June 21, 2012 | 1 Comment »
According to Pete Kasperowicz at The Hill’s Floor Action Blog, Senator Al Franken (D-Minn.) and Representative Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn.) have introduced legislation in Congress intended to reverse limitations on employment discrimination class actions recognized in the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.
A fact sheet available on Senator Franken’s official website describes the key provisions of the bill as follows:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Restoration Act will restore workers’ ability to challenge discriminatory employment practices on a class-wide basis. It adds to Title 28 of the U.S. Code a new section 4201, which does the following:
- Section 4201(a) creates a new judicial procedure – called “group actions” – that workers can use when bringing employment discrimination cases. The requirements for establishing a group action are the same as the pre-Dukes requirements for maintaining a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—namely, clarifying that the merits of the case need not be proven to certify the group action.
- Section 4201(b) provides that group actions can be used regardless of whether the group is challenging an objective employment practice, a subjective employment practice, or a mixed employment practice (such as the use of a written test to qualify for an interview). It also provides that employers’ written anti-discrimination policies can be considered as a defense to certification only insofar as the employer demonstrates that the policy actually has been implemented in practice.
- Section 4201(c) says that the group actions authorized by this section are subject to the same procedural requirements as class actions authorized by Rule 23. These include notice and opt-out requirements. This section also preserves the application of the Class Action Fairness Act and the availability of appeals.
- Section 4201(d) says that courts can use statistical analyses and any other procedures they deem necessary to provide justice to prevailing plaintiffs.
It does not appear from Senator Franken’s fact sheet that the bill has significant bipartisan support, and having just been introduced, there is no telling how far it will go towards becoming law in its present form. However, we’ll keep an eye on any future developments here at CAB.
Posted in class action reform, Class Action Trends, International Class Action Law, Uncategorized, tagged asia class action, china class action, chinese class action, class action, consumer fraud, facebook, hong kong, hong kong class action, international class action, investor, ipo, securities class action, securities fraud on May 30, 2012 | Leave a Comment »
According to Deborah Mao in this article published today on businessweek.com, regulators for the city of Hong Kong has proposed new legislation that would permit representative actions for certain consumer class actions. The legislation is reportedly a response, at least in part, to concerns about the difficulty of shareholders to seek collective redress for alleged acts of securities fraud, although the new law would not initial apply to securities fraud claims.
The legislation would likely provide for class actions to be financed through a public legal aid program rather than through contingency fees, as is typically the case in the United States. The proposal is still in the early stages, and specific legislation remains to be “drafted and introduced,” according to an official quoted in the article.
We’ll keep an eye on future developments relating to the proposed legislation. Stay tuned…