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Posts Tagged ‘23(b)(2)’

This is the third of what will be six posts summarizing my notes of the six presentations at the ABA’s 16th Annual Class Actions Institute held last month in Chicago.  For more on this excellent conference, see my October 31 and November 5 CAB posts.

Session 3 examined the conceptual issues and practical challenges that litigants and courts face in cases seeking certification under the different subparts of Rule 23(b), a question that took on increased importance following the Supreme Court’s Decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.   The panel presentation was titled “Don’t Blame Mrs. O’Leary’s Cow!” Rule 23(b)(3) Classes Under Fire and Rule 23(b)(2)’s Emerging Importance.  Jeffrey A. Leon moderated the panel, which consisted of Robert J. Axelrod, E.K. Cottrell, Professor Francis McGovern, and David S. Stellings.  

Unfortunately, due to a computer crash, I lost some of my notes from this presentation, but I have summarized some of the highlights below:

  • The courts are facing an ever-increasing tension between principle and pragmatism in deciding whether to certify class actions and under what procedure they should be certified.
  • Despite significant hurdles to class certification that have been imposed by the Supreme Court and other federal courts in recent years, the plaintiffs’ bar has a creative “gene” that keeps them pushing the envelope and experimenting on new methods of seeking aggregate redress.  This can be seen in many of the decisions in the lower courts over the past year, and is likely to continue into the future.
  • In the near future, we are likely to see mixed results, as some courts become more restrictive in granting class certification, while others are more receptive to creative ways of certifying classes.
  • Discovery and resolution of substantive issues and Daubert challenges are likely to come at an earlier stage in the process, regardless of the procedural vehicle under which certification is sought.
  • There is likely to be much more of a mixture of the subsections of Rule 23 used to certify classes, including combinations of classes in the same trial.
  • ERISA class actions are an area where the Rule 23(b)(2) class actions for monetary relief remain viable after Dukes.  Pennsylvania Chiropractic Ass’n v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass’n, No. 09 C 5619 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 2011) provides a textbook list of reasons why courts may continue to refuse to certify ERISA claims for monetary relief after Dukes under Rules 23(b)(1), (2) and (3). 
  • But the Supreme Court’s decision in Cigna Corp. v. Amara, No. 09-804 (S. Ct. May 16, 2011) may have breathed new life into the argument that monetary relief may be available to plan members as part of the equitable relief that courts can provide, especially when a trustee is involved.  Among the equitable remedies  that may be available in a particular case is the “surcharge remedy”, which allows plan members to recover money as an equitable remedy for a trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty.  Amara may pave the way to arguments by plaintiffs that claims against a trustee for payment may be characterized as injunctions, for which certification under Rule 23(b)(2) may be appropriate notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dukes.   However, in February, the Second Circuit rejected the argument that claims for disgorgement made on behalf of a putative class of trustees of thousands of ERISA plans, holding that the necessity to determine how to divide any disgorged amount among the plaintiffs meant that the monetary relief was not “incidental” to any equitable relief as required under Dukes.  Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Haddock, 10-4237-cv, 2012 WL 360633 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 2012).

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This is the first in what will be six posts summarizing my notes of the six presentations at the ABA’s 16th Annual Class Actions Institute held last Thursday in Chicago.  The National Institute sets the gold standard for class action conferences, and this year was no exception.  Program Chair Daniel Karon and the rest of the organizing committee did an excellent job selecting six of the most timely and relevant topics facing class action practitioners today.  As always, the list of panelists was a veritable who’s who in the class action field.  If you ever have the opportunity to attend this annual conference, I highly recommend it.

As has become the custom at the National Institute, Columbia Law Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. kicked off this year’s program with a comprehensive and insightful summary of the year’s key developments in class action law.  This year’s presentation saw what has been a hit solo act turn into an even better duet, as Professor Coffee shared the stage with Connecticut Law Professor Alexandra Lahav.  The session was titled “Holy Cow!  This Year the Courts Said What?!” A Brief History of this Year’s Developments in Class Action Jurisprudence.  Attendees were also treated to a comprehensive, 179-page summary of the year in class actions by Professors Coffee and Lahav entitled The New Class Action Landscape: Trends and Developments in Class Certification and Related Topics.

The first part of Professor Coffee’s presentation covered each of the class action-related cases on the U.S. Supreme Court’s docket this term.  Here is a list of those cases with some of Professor Coffee’s insights:

  • Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen, Inc., 660 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2011) - Amgen raises the question whether the plaintiff must establish the materiality of an alleged false statement at the class certification stage of a securities fraud class action.  Professor Coffee believes that this case is a close call, but whichever way it comes out, it does not threaten to end securities class action litigation as we know it.
  • Behrend v. Comcast Corporation, 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011) – In Behrend, the Court could decide whether a trial court must perform a full Daubert analysis of expert testimony offered in support of or in opposition to class certification.  The case raises the question, at least in the antitrust context, whether the plaintiff must present a  formal damages model or whether the mere possibility of common proof is enough.
  • Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 656 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2011) – This is a wage and hour case under the FLSA, which has a different procedure than Rule 23.  FLSA claims are more accurately characterized as collective actions, rather than class action.  The issue is whether a settlement offer for the full amount of the named plaintiff’s FLSA claim can moot the claim and prevent the case from proceeding on a collective basis, a concept also known as “picking off.”   One of the arguments that has been raised is that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed as improvident granted, so it is unclear whether the Court will actually enter a substantive ruling.
  • Knowles v. The Standard Fire Insurance Company, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130077 (W.D. Ark. December 2, 2011) – This case raises the question whether a plaintiff can plead around CAFA removal jurisdiction by stipulating to less than $5 million in damages on behalf of the putative class.  Professor Coffee felt confident in making the prediction that the defendant will win.  He points to dicta in the Court’s recent decision in Smith v. Bayer Corporation calling into question whether a plaintiff can do anything to bind the members of a putative class before it is certified.

Professor Coffee then went on to highlight some of the big developments in the lower courts from over the past year, which include:

The proper burden of proof to be applied at class certification.  The circuits are split on this issue, with some applying a preponderance of the evidence standard and others simply requiring a rigorous analysis with no particular evidentiary standard.

Treatment of expert testimony.  The federal district courts continue to resist resolving a battle of the experts at the class certification stage, but dicta from the Supreme Court in Dukes, as well as holdings by several of the circuits, are putting increasing pressure on the federal courts to perform a Daubert analysis (and the Court could resolve this issue for good in Behrend).

Class Arbitration Waivers.  Some lower courts, especially the Second Circuit, continue to carve out exceptions to the Supreme Court’s ruling favoring arbitration agreements in Concepcion.   One key issue is whether a class arbitration waiver may still be held unconscionable as a matter of federal law.  Professor Coffee quipped that the Second Circuit will only change if the Supreme Court “stuffs it down their throat.”  While unconscionability under state law is no longer a viable argument against enforcing an arbitration clause, clauses with fee-shifting provisions continue to be susceptible to attack.

Settlement Only and Limited Fund Classes.  There is a lower court trend in permitting certification in settlement classes in cases that could not be certified as class actions in contested cases, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s opinion in Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997).  The primary justification tends to be that any individualized issues of fact in the case went to manageability, which is no longer an issue in the settlement context.   In cases where courts have found that individualized issues impact both predominance and manageability, settlement classes have continued to be rejected.

Partial Certification.   The question of issue certification has been one of the hottest trends in the federal courts in the wake of Dukes.  Professor Coffee pointed out that the resolution of whether courts allow partial certification tends to be determined whether the fact of certification creates an extortionate threat to settle the case.

Class Action Settlements.  If you read just one class certification decision this year, Professor Coffee recommends Judge Rosenthal’s memorandum opinion in In re: Heartland Payment Systems, Inc. Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, MDL No. 09-2046 (S.D. Tex. March 20, 2012), which has a well-organized, step-by-step analysis of the approval of a class action settlement.

Professor Lahav focused her remarks on what has been happening in the lower courts in response to the three key aspects of the Court’s decision in Dukes: 1) the “new commonality” requirement; 2) the rejection of the use of Rule 23(b)(2) to recover individualized money damages; and 3) the rejection of “trial by formula,” of the use of statistical sampling to solve individualized damages problems.

The “new commonality”.  Among Professor Lahav’s key observations was that in the Title VII context, there must be a policy, but if there is an identifiable policy, the courts will allow discretionary elements of that policy to be attacked.  This trend is best exemplified by Judge Posner’s decision in McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.  As many commentators predicted, Plaintiffs have had better success after Dukes by narrowing the geographic scope of discrimination claims.  This has also been true in the consumer context.  In the civil rights context, allegations of systemic constitutional violations have had success when the courts have focused on the systemic nature of the practice, but not when courts have focused on the effects of a systemic practice on the prospective class members.  In general, there has been an increasing reliance on issues classes to overcome individualized issues that might destroy commonality or predominance.

Rule 23(b)(2) and monetary damages.  The majority opinion in Dukes raised the question whether there can ever be a class with monetary damages.  None of the circuit courts have provided further guidance on when damages might be sufficiently “incidental” to still allow relief.  One area that has seen mixed results since Dukes is the area of medical monitoring class actions, where the remedy sought is medical monitoring of the possible health effects of a toxic exposure but the cost of monitoring can vary from person to person.  Professor Lahav pointed to the Third Circuit’s decision in Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., No. 10-2108 (3d Cir., Aug. 25, 2011), as potentially supporting arguments on both sides.  Hybrid class actions, where classes are certified based on both Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3), are becoming increasingly common, especially in the Title VII context.  One unanswered question is whether damages claims are precluded if a Rule 23(b)(2) class is certified but not successful.

Statistical evidence and “trial by formula.”   Statistical evidence is still accepted in contexts where it has been accepted traditionally, e.g. civil rights, disparate impact, and antitrust cases.  It is not allowed in cases where the defendant can raise individualized defenses.  One proposed solution is, again, issues classes, but this creates a class action funding problem – How do lawyers get paid?

Professor Lahav also revisited statistical trends in class actions, focusing primarily on data compiled by the Federal Judicial Center in 2008 which analyzed the impact of the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”).  She made the key point that statistical data on class action trends has been severely lacking since the FJC study, making updated empirical analysis of class action trends difficult.

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Last Friday, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued a significant employment class action decision that may challenge conventional wisdom about the impact of the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.   The opinion, authored by respected Judge Richard Posner, is McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 11-3639 (7th Cir., Feb. 24, 2012).

The procedural history of McReynolds is interesting, because the plaintiffs had actually moved for reconsideration of an earlier denial of class certification after the decidedly pro-employer decision in Dukes was announced.  Although the trial court judge was unconvinced to change his earlier decision, he did agree that Dukes presented a good basis for reconsideration of the class action issue, and expressly stated in his decision that he believed the case was a good candidate for an interlocutory appeal under Rule 23(f).

The Seventh Circuit accepted the appeal, and reversed the denial of class certification.  The Seventh Circuit panel recognized that individualized issues would prevent certification of any claims for back pay or damages, but held that certification of the issue of whether the defendant’s challenged employment policies had an adverse impact on members of a protected class would still be appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2), which allows a class to be certified for the purpose of awarding injunctive relief, and Rule 23(c)(4), which allows certification of particular issues.  Essentially, the case would be certified for the purpose of deciding whether the defendant’s challenged policies created a disparate impact to members of a protected class and for the purpose of ruling on plaintiffs’ request to enjoin the practices.  Any claims for back pay, compensatory or punitive damages would then have to be brought as separate proceedings. 

In reaching its conclusion, the court drew a key factual distinction between the practices being challenged in the case before it and the practices that had been challenged in Dukes.  In McReynolds, the practice being challenged was the company-wide policy of “permitting brokers to form their own teams and prescribing criteria for account distributions that favor the already successfulthose who may owe heir success to having been invited to join a successful or promising team.”  The court distinguished this policy, which it characterized as a firm-wide policy of Merrill Lynch, from the allegations in Dukes, which were that the lack of a uniform corporate policy on discrimination created too much discretion in local managers to create locally discriminatory policies.

I’ll be posting more on this decision within the coming week, so stay tuned…

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I’m embarrassingly late in posting a link to a terrific article from Steptoe & Johnson Partner Jennifer Quinn-Barabanov entitled Has Dukes Killed Medical Monitoring?  The article, published in the November 2011 Issue of DRI’s For the Defense Magazine, explores the potential impact of the Supreme Court’s decision Dukes in defending against class certification of product liability claims that seek as a remedy medical monitoring of class members who were exposed to an allegedly harmful product.

I highly recommend Quinn-Barabanov’s article for those of you who may have missed it when it came out in November.  The article is a must-read for anyone facing (or prosecuting) a medical monitoring class action.

It also makes at least two key contributions that are independent of the medical monitoring context.  First, it offers an analysis of the potential application of various aspects of the Wal-mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes decision outside of the employment discrimination context, including the arguably heightened commonality analysis and the admissibility of expert testimony in support of class certification.  Second, it is a good primer on the possible distinctions between truly injunctive relief, which still may be the basis for a Rule 23(b)(2) class action, and merely equitable relief incidental to a claim for monetary relief, which the Dukes Court held cannot support class certification under Rule 23(b)(2).

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Along with leading Colorado Employment attorney Todd J. McNamara, I’ll be presenting at a breakfast seminar at the CBA-CLE next Tuesday with the (hopefully) self-explanatory title: Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Reshaping Class Certification.   The particulars follow below.  Hope to see you there!

When:

July 12, 2011 8:30 AM – 9:30 AM

Where:

CLECI Large Classroom
1900 Grant Street, Suite 300
Denver CO 80203
(303) 860-0608

Credits:

General credits: 1.00

Prices

CBA Member $59.00
CBA Labor & Employment Section Member $29.00
CBA Litigation Section Member $29.00
Non Member $69.00
 
July 2011
 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Reshaping Class CertificationLIVE IN DENVER
 
 
Program Description:
 
When it issued its decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court did much more than simply end one of the largest class action suits in American history. It also set a host of new ground rules for federal courts to evaluate class certification, both in employment discrimination cases and in other types of class actions. This program will discuss the significant potential impacts of this landmark decision on a host of issues, including 1) evaluation of merits issues at the class certification stage; 2) the potentially broadened scope of the commonality element of FRCP 23(a); 3) the standards for evaluating expert testimony at the class certification stage; 4) the threshold standard needed to establish “common proof” of an employment or other business practice; 5) the use of statistical evidence in support of class certification; and 6) the standards for adjudicating claims for monetary relief under FRCP 23(b)(2). The program will examine what the Court had to say about these and other topics, and it will also explore the questions that remain unanswered following the decision.
 
Presented by Paul G. Karlsgodt, Esq. and Todd J. McNamara, Esq.
 
Agenda:
8:00 am – 8:30 am Registration
8:30 am – 9:30 am Program (Continental Breakfast Provided)
 
 
Faculty:
 
Paul G. Karlsgodt, Esq.
Baker Hostetler
 
Paul Karlsgodt is a litigation partner whose practice emphasizes class action defense and other complex commercial litigation. Mr. Karlsgodt has represented insurance companies and other FORTUNE 500 companies in numerous nationwide and statewide consumer class action lawsuits and related litigation. He has represented clients in class action lawsuits involving sales and marketing practices, insurance coverage, claims adjustment practices, corporate securities, retailer/dealer disputes, employment and taxation.
 
Mr. Karlsgodt is editor and primary contributor to the legal blog, http://www.ClassActionBlawg.com, which covers a variety of class action-related issues, including decisions, trends, best practices, news and reform, both in the U.S. and throughout the world. He also founded and served as the first Chair of the Class Actions, Derivative Suits and Mass Torts Subsection of the Litigation Section of the Colorado Bar Association. He remains an active member of the Subsection.
 
 
Todd J. McNamara, Esq.
McNamara Roseman & Kazmierski LLP
 
 
Todd McNamara opened his own firm in 1995 and limits his practice exclusively to employment law matters. Mr. McNamara was lead private class counsel in Wilkerson, et al., v. Martin-Marietta, the largest age discrimination claim brought within the State of Colorado, which settled for a reported $7.6 million. Mr. McNamara secured the first race discrimination verdict in the United States against a real estate franchise for failure to award a sales agency to an African-American in Tyler v. ReMax. Most recently, Mr. McNamara, together with class cocounsel, settled a $3.85 million disability discrimination case against the United States Postal Services.
 
Todd has previously served as co-chair of the Colorado Bar Association Labor Law Committee, and is a member of the National Employment Lawyers Association. He serves as an arbitrator and mediator for the American Arbitration Association Employment Panel. He is co-editor of FederalEmployment Jury Instructions and has just recently completed a seventh supplement to that publication, which is used throughout the United States by both lawyers and judges. He is a co-chapter editor with the Practitioners Guide to Colorado Employment Law and has published a number of other articles on employment law issues in both Trial Talk and The Colorado Lawyer. Todd is a Fellow of The College of Labor and Employment Lawyers, one of approximately only 20 in Colorado.

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Last week, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner authored an opinion addressing one of the key issues awaiting a ruling by the United States Supreme Court this term, holding that an employment discrimination class action seeking back pay could not be certified under FRCP 23(b)(2).   Here is a relevant excerpt from the opinion, Randall v. Rolls-Royce Corp., No. 10-3446, slip op.  at 12-14 (7th Cir., March 30 2011) (I have removed the internal citations for ease of reading),

[I]magine if the plaintiffs in this case were just seeking an injunction commanding basepay equalization between male and female employees.

But that’s not what they’re seeking, exclusively or even mainly; and indeed this isn’t a proper Rule 23(b)(2) suit.  Class action lawyers like to sue under that provision because it is less demanding, in a variety of ways, than Rule 23(b)(3) suits, which usually are the only available alternative. . . . Of particular significance, “plaintiffs may attempt to shoehorn damages actions into the Rule 23(b)(2) framework, depriving class members of notice and opt-out protections. The incentives to do so are large. Plaintiffs’ counsel effectively gathers clients—often thousands of clients—by a certification under (b)(2). Defendants attempting to purchase res judicata may prefer certification under (b)(2) over (b)(3).” . . . How far Rule 23(b)(2) can be stretched is the issue in the gigantic class action against Wal-Mart, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. . . . now before the Supreme Court. The present case is not as big a stretch, but it is big enough. 

True, the only monetary relief sought is back pay; true, too—contrary to the common but erroneous notion that courts of equity can’t award monetary relief—they can do so if the award is merely incidental to the grant of an injunction or declaratory relief: “incidental” in the sense of requiring only a mechanical computation. That is the “clean-up” doctrine of equity. . . . In such a case, to make the class representative bring a second suit, for damages, on top of his injunctive action would create pointless redundancy. . . .

The plaintiffs argue that if only equitable relief is sought, a class action suit may be maintained under Rule 23(b)(2) even if the equitable relief is mainly monetary. We disagree. To read “injunctive” in the rule to mean “equitable” is to become mired in sticky questions of differentiating between “legal” and “equitable” actions—and such questions abound. . . .  We can avoid the mire by recognizing that Rule 23(b)(2) class actions are limited to cases in which “final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief” is appropriate, rather than extending to all cases in which any kind of equitable relief is sought. . . . The monetary relief sought in a case, whether denominated legal or equitable, may make the case unsuitable for Rule 23(b)(2) treatment. . . .  As this case illustrates: calculating the amount of back pay to which the members of the class would be entitled if the plaintiffs prevailed would require 500 separate hearings. The monetary tail would be wagging the injunction dog. An injunction thus “would not provide ‘final’ relief as required by Rule 23(b)(2). An injunction is not a final remedy if it would merely lay an evidentiary foundation for subsequent determinations of liability.”

Could it be that the resolution of this issue is as simple as the recognition that “equitable” doesn’t mean “injunctive” and that class actions seeking monetary relief, whether “equitable” or “legal” can only be brought under Rule 23(b)(3), not Rule 23(b)(2)?  The Supreme Court should have an answer within the next two months.

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The United States Supreme Court will hold oral argument next Tuesday, March 29, 2011, in case of Wal-mart v. Dukes, No. 10-277.  The issue for review, at least so far, according to order granting certiorari, is:

Whether claims for monetary relief can be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) – which by its terms is limited to injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief – and, if so, under what circumstances.

Hopefully, questions posed by the justices during the argument will also provide insight into what the Court meant in its somewhat vague directive that the parties brief the issue “Whether the Class Certification ordered under Rule 23(b)(2) was consistent with Rule 23(a).”

Another thing I’ll be looking out for is whether the questions appear to limit the analysis to the employment discrimination context, or whether they portend a more general analysis of Rule 23 that could impact class actions in other subject matter areas.

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The Baker Hostetler website has a new Executive Alert discussing the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Kartman v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., Case no. 09-1725, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2830, and its potential implications.  Kartman addressed, among other things, the applicability of Rule 23(b)(2) to consumer class actions in which the ultimate goal is to recover money for class members.  According to the Executive Alert:

This decision is significant in its rejection of the creative attempt to certify a class of consumer claims for injunctive relief, the analysis of the “finality” and “appropriateness” elements of Rule 23(b)(2) for which little authority exists, and the willingness to delve into the merits of the underlying claims to determine that class certification was not appropriate.

Congratulations to my partner, Mark Johnson, and the rest of his team in Columbus on their victory in the case on behalf of State Farm.

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The seemingly revolutionary concept of a “reverse class action” has gotten some attention from the technical media lately, in reference to efforts by the holder of a copyright to seek common relief against a group of alleged infringers.  As pointed out earlier today by Mike Masnick in this entry on his blog TechDirt, “reverse class action” in this context is actually a procedural vehicle that is not new, but is rarely used in practice: certification of a class of defendants.

Rule 23(a) expressly contemplates the possibility of a defendant class because it provides that “[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if” the prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy are satisfied.  FRCP 23(a) (emphasis added).  However, the successful use of this mechanism in practice has proven rare.

Defendant classes in cases seeking damages are impractical in most cases because Rule 23(b)(3), the portion of the rule governing actions for damages, requires that class members be given notice and an opportunity to opt out of the case.  So, you could theoretically sue a class for damages if you could meet the other criteria, but each defendant would have the right to exclude himself or herself from the case, which could leave you back where you started.

Another possibility is an action for injunctive relief against a defendant class under FRCP 23(b)(2).  Depending on Supreme Court’s upcoming decision in Wal-mart v. Dukes, Rule 23(b)(2) could provide a mechanism for obtaining significant monetary relief as well, without the same opportunity as in Rule 23(b)(3) for class members to opt out.  However, courts are split on whether the express language of FRCP 23(b)(2) prevents certification of a defendant class.  Some courts have held that the language in FRCP 23(b)(2) permitting class certification when  “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class . . .” means, logically, that the party opposing class certification cannot be the defendant.  However, other courts have allowed defendant classes under FRCP 23(b)(2), at least in special situations, such as a case against a class of government officials.   See Generally Brown v. Kelly, No. 07-3356-cv, slip op. (2d Cir., June 24, 2010) (discussing the split in the courts recognizing that Rule 23(b)(2) could be used to certify a class of local government officials under some circumstances, but reversing class certification on other grounds).

That leaves FRCP 23(b)(1).  Again, this section uses the phrase “by or against individual class members,” so it at least opens up the possibility of a defendant class.  However Rule 23(b)(1)(A) authorizes class actions only when individual actions “would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class,” potentially ruling out classes of defendants categorically under the same reasoning that has been applied to Rule 23(b)(2).  Rule 23(b)(1)(B) allows class actions where individual adjudications “would be dispositive of the interest of the other members” or “would substantially impede or impair their ability to protect their interests.”   It is not clearly established what circumstances might meet this standard, but the mere possibility that one case will have a stare decisis (precedential) effect on others is probably not  enough.  (See this 2003 Tech Law Journal article discussing Tilley v. TJX Cos., 345 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2003)).

For more on the concept of defendant classes (in the patent infringement context), see this June 2009 Los Angeles Lawyer article by Mark Anchor Albert.

For anyone curious about the possibility of defendant class actions in Canada, see this 2004 article by Vince Morabito  in the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law.

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As 2010 winds down, it’s time to review the key developments in class action law.  It was an especially busy year for the federal courts, and in particular the U.S. Supreme Court, on issues impacting class action practice.  Here, in chronological order, are 10 key developments from the year that was:

  1. January 5 – In In re Baycol Products Litigation, the Eighth Circuit follows the Seventh Circuit’s lead in upholding the right of a federal court to enjoin a putative statewide class action from proceeding where a federal court had already denied class certification in a case involving substantially similar claims.  (See CAB entries dated January 7 and January 12).
  2. February 23 – In a decision that will impact many class actions removed under the Class Action Fairness Act, the Supreme Court adopts the “nerve center test” as the standard for determining corporate citizenship, in Hertz Corp. v. Friend.  (See CAB entry dated March 2)
  3. March 31 – The Supreme Court holds that states may not regulate the types of claims that may be filed as class actions in the federal courts, in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.  (See CAB entry dated April 8)
  4. April 7 – In American Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, the Seventh Circuit holds that a trial court must rule on challenges to the admissibility of expert testimony relevant to class certification before deciding whether a class may be certified.  (See CAB entry dated May 4)
  5. April 26 – The Ninth Circuit issues its decision in Dukes v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc., adopting rigorous class certification standards similar to those previously adopted by the Second Circuit in In re IPO Securities Litigation, 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006), but nonetheless certifying under FRCP 23(b)(2), what has been called the largest employment discrimination class action in history.
  6. April 27 – The Supreme Court seemingly puts an end, for all practical purposes, to the concept of class arbitration by holding that a defendant could not be compelled to defend an arbitration on a class basis where the arbitration clause did not expressly provide for class arbitration, in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp.  (See CAB entry dated May 11).
  7. June 24 – In Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the Supreme Court deals a fatal blow to “foreign-cubed” class actions, holding that § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 does not allow for fraud claims involving transactions on foreign exchanges that occurred outside the United States. (See case summary at SCOTUS blog).
  8. July 19, October 20 - An Eleventh Circuit panel issues a controversial decision in Cappuccitti v. DirecTV, Inc., severely restricting CAFA removal jurisdiction to cases where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 with respect to at least one class member, but later reverses itself in an October 15 opinion.  (See Guest Post from Eric Jon Taylor and Jon Chally at CAFA Law Blog for more on the first decision and this October 20 CAB entry on the second decision).
  9. November 9 – Supreme Court hears oral argument in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, in which the Court considers whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state law holding a class arbitration waiver unconscionable.  (See CAB fsummary of oral argument dated November 17).
  10. December 6 – Supreme Court grants certiorari in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, to decide the issue of whether a claim for monetary relief can be certified under FRCP 23(b)(2).  (See CAB entry dated December 7).

Just considering the cases still awaiting ruling before the Supreme Court, 2011 promises to be another exciting year in the world of class actions.  Happy New Year to all!

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