Posts Tagged ‘associational standing’

Editor’s Note: The publication schedule for my notes of the recent international class action conference at the University of Haifa has suffered various setbacks due to staffing constraints.  Of course, since I have a staff of one, I only have myself to blame.  In any event, here is the third installment.  Expect additional installments in the coming weeks.

Panel 2: Enforcement of consumer rights by associations and regulators


The second panel presentation focused on the enforcement of collective rights by regulators and associations, a phenomenon that is the current norm for many types of collective redress proceedings throughout the world.  The panel discussed developments and case studies in Brazil, France, Germany, the UK, and other jurisdictions where regulatory and associational enforcement is more common, and juxtaposed those developments against the US collective redress regime, which focuses on private enforcement, particularly through the class action procedure.

The discussion touched on the pros and cons of private entrepreneurial litigation versus regulatory or nonprofit public interest enforcement, as well as the benefits and disadvantages of the US class action model as compared to public and associational regimes common in Europe and Latin America.  The panel repeated the theme that policymakers outside the US often believe that private enforcement easier creates an unacceptable risk of “letting the wolves in” and encouraging frivolous litigation.  On the other hand, there is a recognition that the US model can result in more frequent and higher recoveries for injured parties, oftentimes with lower overall transaction costs.

The panel discussed criticisms that regulatory/associational enforcement model may be illusory in many cases.  Regulators have the power to enforce in many EU countries by don’t often exercise it.  Many public authorities don’t like the idea of pursuing redress for individual consumers, preferring to act in more of a traditional regulatory enforcement role where they seek penalties or injunctive relief, but not individual damages for injured parties.  Nonprofit or special purpose associations often lack the financial incentive to pursue collective litigation, leading to a void in enforcement that is now being filled by emerging litigation funding models.  However, there is an ongoing debate about whether litigation funding should be limited to not-for-profit public interest organizations or whether for-profit, venture capitalist litigation funding should be allowed.

The panel also discussed the significant impact of the lower pays rule, where an unsuccessful plaintiff is responsible for paying the legal fees of the defendant, in discouraging private enforcement in jurisdictions outside the US. The loser pays rule creates a greater need for associational or public enforcement that is not generally present in the US, where the “American Rule” generally makes both sides responsible for their own legal costs despite the outcome, in the absence of a statutory cost-shifting provision.

Another factor discussed by the panel as impacting the effectiveness of a collective redress regime is whether the model allows for an opt in collective action or opt out class action.  In an opt-in proceeding an individual claimant has to take affirmative steps to participate.  In an opt-out proceeding, exemplified by the US class action rule, potential claimants can be passive beneficiaries to the litigation and reap the benefits of a successful case without taking any affirmative action at all, but risk having their rights barred if the action is not successful.   Panelists discussed situations in which opt-in regimes incentivized potential claimants hold back and await the outcome of regulatory or associational legal action before deciding whether to act at all, something US class action procedures have the practical effect of discouraging in most cases.

I found this presentation intriguing because it offered a summary of the key comparative differences between collective redress regimes available outside the US as compared to the US class action model, and offered key insights into many of the policy rationales underlying those differences.

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According to this article by Anindita Dey of the Business Standard yesterday, an Indian securities regulator has announced plans to fund a program to reimburse litigation expenses actions brought on behalf of investors for alleged illegal securities practices.  The fund would be available to a group of registered investor associations who could apply for reimbursement for legal expenses from the fund, but only after those expenses have been incurred and only after a showing that at least 1,000 investors are affected by the alleged practices. 

The representative securities litigation described in the article is characterized as similar to class action litigation in the U.S., but it appears to differ in at least two important respects.  The first difference is the use of litigation fundingto support group litigation.  In the U.S., the funding of a lawsuit is usually accomplished by law firms who pursue the case and often advance costs in the hopes of recovering a portion of the judgment through a contingent fee or a fee award.  In other parts of the world, such as in Australia, private litigation funding firms provide funding for class actions in exchange for a portion of any recovery.  The funding scheme described in the article appears to differ slightly from that prevalent in Australia in that it is state-funded rather than private. 

The second difference is the method in which the representation is being achieved.  In the U.S., an individual investor or small group of investors typically seek appointment as class representatives to represent a larger class of investors.  By contrast, the type of litigation being described in the article contemplates that an association would bring the action on behalf of its members.  Associational representation is a procedural vehicle that has been used in the U.S., but is far less common in securities litigation than true class actions.

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I commented recently on the fact that the well publicized “class-action” trial against the United States Department of Veteran’s Affairs was never actually certified as a class action.  Instead, the case is being pursued by two nonprofit veterans’ advocacy groups who are pursuing the case on behalf of their members based on a concept called associational standing.  The popular media often uses the misnomer “class action” to define a wide range of lawsuits in which one or a few litigants prosecute a case on behalf of a larger group of interested parties.  Here is a partial glossary of them, along with some other terms often associated with representative actions:

Class Actions – Class actions are brought by one or more class representatives on behalf of a larger group of similarly situated people or legal entities.  Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and similar state rules of civil procedure, govern whether a case can proceed as a class action.  A case does not become a true class action until the judge certifies a class.  Before a class is certified, lawyers and courts often refer to the case as a putative class action.

Derivative Suits – These lawsuits are brought by shareholders of a corporation on behalf of the corporation to pursue the rights of the corporation that the corporation itself has failed to enforce.  Derivative suits are governed by Rule 23.1, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and similar state court rules.  A lawyer considering a lawsuit for corporate wrongdoing may face a choice between filing the case as a class action or a derivative suit.  See this recent WSJ Law Blog article for a recent example.

Collective actions – Some statutes, notably the federal Age Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA) and Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), allow a court to certify a collective action as opposed to a representative action.  The key difference between these collective actions and representative actions like class actions is that in a collective action, absent parties are asked whether they want to opt in to the lawsuit.  By contrast, in a class action, absent parties are bound by the result of the litigation unless they opt out of the case after getting notice.  Many FLSA cases are brought as both collective actions and class actions.   The collective action procedure covers the FLSA claim, while the class action procedure governs any related state law claims.  Here’s a good article for more detail on the distinctions between collective actions and class actions.

Attorney general actions – State attorneys general and other governmental authorities (like the Federal Trade Commission) may, by statute, bring actions to enforce the rights of consumers and the public at large.  Here’s a link to the Colorado Attorney General’s consumer protection page.  See the Federal Trade Commission website for examples of consumer actions being pursued by the FTC.

Parens patriae actions – Parens patriae actions are a species of attorney general actions in which the government brings claims to recover monetary losses on behalf of its citizens.  In these actions, the government stands in the shoes of individual citizens and prosecutes the action to recover money for their benefit.  Here’s a link to a paper addressing parens patriae actions.

Private attorney general actions – Some statutes allow any person to bring an action to protect the rights of the public.  Until recently, an example of a statute allowing this type of action was the California Unfair Competition Law, Business & Professions Code Section 17200, which allowed a case to be brought on behalf of consumers injured by a defendant’s act of unfair competition, whether or not the plaintiff him or herself was harmed in any way.  This changed recently when the voter referendum Proposition 64 was passed, which requires a litigant to have lost money or other property as a result of the challenged practice, and must be able to satisfy the requirements for a class action in order to be allowed to pursue a UCL claim in a representative capacity.  A great resource for developments on the UCL is Kimberly Kralowec’s blog The UCL Practitioner.  Another example is California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), also called the Bounty Hunter Statute, which allows employees to pursue violations of the state labor code whether or not they had suffer injury, including the ability to pursue statutory penalties on behalf of the state and to share in any recovery of those penalties.  Here’s a link to an interesting California Court of Appeal decision addressing both PAGA and the UCL and the viability of an assignment of representative claims under those laws.

Qui tam actions – The federal False Claims Act is another example of a law that allows a private individual to pursue an action on behalf of the government.  An individual who has information about the misappropriate or theft of government funds may file an lawsuit under the Act known as a qui tam action.  The government has an opportunity to decide to take over the prosecution of the case, but if it declines, the person who filed the action may proceed and in the event of a recovery, he or she is entitled to a portion of the recovery.  Here is a link to an article summarizing the federal False Claims Act.

Associational actions – An association may, in some circumstances, bring an action on behalf of its members.  See this previous entry regarding the recent trial against the VA for more discussion on the requirements for associational standing.

Mass actions – Many lawsuits that people commonly associate with the term “class action” are really mass actions.  Mass actions are cases that involve the joinder of many individual claims for discovery, resolution of certain legal issues, or other purposes.  Unlike class actions, however, each claim ultimately has to be brought by an individual plaintiff, who must have some involvement in the proceedings.  Examples include many products liability cases, like those involving alleged injuries caused by tobacco, asbestos, or pharmaceuticals, where a common set of acts form the basis of a the claim for liability but where the effects are too individualized to establish all of the requirements necessary to support a true class action.  They may also be cases involving claims that arise from a single catastrophic event, like an airplane crash, toxic leak, or oil spill.  A well-known example is the Exxon Valdez oil spill case.  When numerous mass actions against the same defendant or group of defendants are filed in the federal courts, the cases are often transferred to a single district court under rules promulgated by the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL)

Bellwether trials – This is not so much a type of lawsuit but rather a procedural device to assist in resolving cases involving similar claims.  A bellwether trial is a essentially a sample test case, where one claim or set of claims are tried first to establish a precedent for the rest.  Bellwether trials generally cannot be used to bind parties in one case to the results of another, but they can be a useful tool for providing information to assist attorneys with valuing similar cases for settlement purposes.  Here are some good entries discussing bellwether trials from the Drug and Device Blog and the Mass Tort Litigation Blog.

Aggregator actions – For lack of a better phrase, this novel procedural vehicle involves the assignment of various plaintiffs’ right to pursue a lawsuit to a single person or entity, called an aggregator.  This procedural device is at issue in a case now pending before the United States Supreme Court.  See this entry at SCOTUS Blog.

Virtual representation – This is a concept applied in the trusts and estates area.  Under the doctrine of virtual representation, the participation in a proceeding of one heir or trust beneficiary can sometimes be deemed to be sufficient to protect the interests of unborn, unascertainable, or minor beneficiaries who could not otherwise appear.  See page 20 of this comprehensive summary of the 2005 Uniform Trust Code.

Non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel – The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, provides that a party can be prevented from relitigating certain issues that were previously resolved against it.  Ordinarily, the concept applies to issues that were previously litigated between the same parties, but is sometimes possible for a plaintiff to bind a defendant to an earlier ruling in a case in which the plaintiff was not a party, if the earlier case involved a plaintiff with similar interests, and if the defendant had the same incentives to defend the lawsuit.  This doctrine has been applied only in very limited situations.  For a good analysis, see this Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion

Reverse Bifurcation – Is a controversial procedure used in the West Virginia courts in which the punitive damages phase of a mass tort case against a defendant is tried before the liability phase.  See previous entries here, here, and here.

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There have been a variety of recent news reports about a trial that began today in a “class action” lawsuit against the United States Department of Veterans Affairs, or VA.

The case, now captioned Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, was filed by two nonprofit groups on behalf of veterans of the Iraq and Afganistan wars and earlier conflicts alleging systemic problems in the VA’s system of providing healthcare services and admistering benefits for veterans with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and other mental illnesses.  Among the allegations is that delays in the processing of claims and other problems with claims handling and appeals of the denials of those claims have contributed to an “epidemic of suicides” among affected veterans.  A two-week trial to the court began today before Judge Samuel Conti of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in San Fransisco.  The plaintiffs seek injunctive relief including supervision over VA healthcare services and the administration of VA benefits, including the appointment of a special master to oversee the handling of claims.  The claims appear to include constitutional due process claims and statutory claims under specific federal laws providing for veterans’ medical benefits.  Trial is to the court rather than to a jury because the plaintiffs are seeking an injunction and not money damages.

From a class action practitioner’s perspective, perhaps the most interesting aspect of the case is the fact that it is not a class action at all.  According to a report on Law.com (click here), the case was originally filed as a class action but the plaintiffs’ attorneys ultimately made a strategic decision not to seek class certification.  Rather than seeking certification on behalf of a class of veterans, plaintiffs’ counsel decided to proceed solely on behalf of two nonprofit veterans’ advocacy groups, Veterans for Common Sense and Veterans United for Truth.  In an order dated January 10, 2008, Judge Conti had previously denied the government’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the two groups lacked standing to sue.  (Copy of January 10, 2008 Order).  Rejecting the government’s argument that the two groups were mere advocacy groups who could not sue by themselves without the participation of individual veterans, the court held that the two groups had organizational standing under the principles outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000) and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).  Under these principles, an association may sue on behalf of its individual members if

its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.

Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181.  In turn, the participation of individual members is not required when its members face “immediate or threatened injury” as a result of the challenged action and “the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make the individual participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolution of the cause.”  Warth, 422 U.S. at 511.  In applying these standards, the court concluded that

[g]iven the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims, especially in regard to the allegations of systemic legal violations, the Court, at this stage, is not convinced that the individual participation of each injured party will be indispensable to the present action. Plaintiffs’ due process claim will depend largely on the claims adjudication procedures enacted under the VJRA, and not necessarily on individual veteran’s claims. The same is true regarding Plaintiffs’ access to the courts claim. Plaintiffs’ claim for denial of statutorily mandated health care can satisfy this standing requirement if, for example, Plaintiffs demonstrate that the current system under the VJRA leads to system-wide denials of this health care or if the VA fails to recognize and treat PTSD within this two-year period.

January 10, 2008 Order at 6.  However, the Court also suggested that this decision might be subject to later change should future events make clear that the participation of individual veterans would be required.  Presumably, this means that the representative nature of the lawsuit is subject to additional argument and evidence at trial, in addition to the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.

Copies of the various pleadings, orders, and other filings in the case are available at a website provided by the plaintiff organizations (click here).

Other various articles discussing the case are listed below:









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