Along with Angela Sabbe of Navigant Consulting, I recently participated in an ABA “Sound Advice” podcast discussing recent trends in data privacy class action settlements. Members can access the podcast by clicking the link below. If you aren’t already a member of the ABA section of litigation, you can join by clicking this link. You’ll get access to this podcast and other useful materials to help supplement your professional development.
Posts Tagged ‘heartland’
Posted in Class Action Settlements, Class Action Trends, Data Privacy Class Actions, tagged ABA, class action, data breach, data privacy, heartland, home depot, payment card, section of litigation, target, tj maxx, tjx on February 27, 2017| Leave a Comment »
Breaking Down the Target Payment Card Breach Settlement – It’s Not as Groundbreaking as You’ve Been Led to Believe
Posted in Articles, Class Action Settlements, Commentary, Data Privacy Class Actions, tagged attorney's fee, class action, class action settlement, consumer class action, credit card, cy pres, data breach, data privacy, fund, heartland, michaels, payment card, reversion, target, target settlement, tj maxx on March 20, 2015| 4 Comments »
HarrisMartin’s Data Breach Litigation Conference: The Coming of Age is scheduled for next Wednesday, March 25, 2015, at the Westin San Diego. I’ll be speaking on a panel titled Creative Approaches to Settling Data Breach Cases with Ben Barnow of Barnow and Associates, P.C., Chicago. So, the news this week was very timely that Target has reached a settlement in the consumer class actions arising out of its massive payment card breach. Because a few clients and colleagues on both sides of the bar have asked for my opinion about the settlement, I thought I’d share a few thoughts here.
Settlements in data breach cases have been fairly rare up to this point, as many data breach cases have met their doom at the pleadings stage due to the inability of plaintiffs to show injury-in-fact sufficient to give them standing. Payment Card cases have been an exception because there are real financial losses to consumers that can flow naturally from a hacking incident. Importantly, these losses generally do not include the amount of any fraudulent card transactions because federal law limits consumer liability to $50 and the major card brands go further and impose $0 liability requirements on issuing banks. However, other incidental losses, such as replacement card fees, interest, finance charges by other companies due to missed payments, to name a few, can result from a payment card breach. For this reason, claims in several payment card class actions, including Target (Target Order on Motion to Dismiss) have survived motions to dismiss, leading many defendants to settle these cases. Payment card class actions against Heartland Payment Systems, TJ Maxx, Michaels Stores, and others were all resolved by class-wide settlements.
The Target Settlement has been praised and derided by the mainstream and legal trade media with a host of characterizations ranging from “huge” to “affordable” to “tiny.” In fact, Target’s settlement is not particularly groundbreaking beyond the media attention that it has garnered. Instead, it shares many of the features of the payment card settlements that came before it, and it is not significantly different in terms of its cost or in terms of the benefits it would provide to consumers, if finally approved.
Here is a summary of some of the key features of the settlement:
Overall Costs to Target
Claims Fund. Target is to pay $10M to create a fund to pay consumers who claim certain out-of-pocket losses and time spent in connection with those losses (discussed in more detail below). The fund is non-reversionary, meaning unclaimed funds don’t go back to the defendant. Instead, the agreement contemplates that the court will decide who unclaimed funds are to be distributed. (For a discussion of how courts can deal with unclaimed funds, see this February 2010 CAB post.)
Attorneys’ Fees. The plaintiffs will request court approval of up to $6.75M in fees. Target may object to the initial request, but it may not appeal any decision by the trial court to award $6.75M or less. Target must pay the fees awarded in addition to the $10M fund.
Settlement Expenses. Target must pay for all settlement administrative expenses in addition to claims fund and fees. This includes the expenses to provide both published and direct notice of the settlement to affected customers and the costs to administer claims and make payments to claimants if the settlement is finally approved. For a class size as large as Target’s these costs can easily measure in the millions of dollars.
Total Payment by Target. So, my guess it that the total payout by Target is likely to be closer to $19M, assuming the full amount of fees are approved.
Settlement Benefits to Consumers
One of the attachments to the Settlement Agreement is a Distribution Plan that generally outlines the benefits available to claimants. The Distribution Plan doesn’t itemize every conceivable loss that might qualify for compensation, but it attaches sample claim forms that give more insight into the specific benefits that are contemplated. Most of the categories of reimbursable losses are similar to those provided for in other payment card settlements. Here’s a summary, with some comments on each category:
- Payment for unreimbursed, out-of-pocket expenses, with a $10,000 cap per claim – Note that due to the zero consumer liability rules on fraud losses, combined with the fact that payment card information cannot be used to commit other forms of identity theft, it is extremely unlikely that any individual person will have a claim for an amount near the cap. If it were otherwise, then the fund would only be sufficient to pay 1000 claims. Other payment card settlements have included individual caps for the most typical types of expenses, which rarely exceed $200 or so, with a separate fund available for extraordinary claims. The Target settlement omits this smaller cap, perhaps because experience has shown that it is generally unnecessary to control unreasonable or fraudulent claims.
- Payment for 2 hours of time at $10/hour associated with each type of actual loss claimed – Payments for time are an interesting feature of payment card settlements. Because of the zero consumer liability for fraud loss imposed by the card brands, mere lost time and aggravation make up the vast majority of consumer impact in a payment card breach. However, time and inconvenience are generally not considered injuries for which damages can be recovered, so by agreeing to pay for lost time, the defendant is agreeing to pay for something that the plaintiffs probably couldn’t recover if the case went to trial. Nonetheless, there is nothing preventing defendants from offering these benefits in a class action settlement setting, and it has become common for defendants to offer payments for lost time. Because claims for time are susceptible to fraud and abuse and are difficult to document, the amounts available tend to be limited to 1-3 hours. Based on the sample claim form, the Target settlement seems to allow claims for time spent correcting fraudulent charges, but it doesn’t appear to allow claims for lost time resulting from card replacement (for example, having to change the number on automatic or recurring payments), which is something that affects far more consumers than fraud itself in the aftermath of a payment card breach. Other payment card settlements have allowed claims for lost time for either fraud or for dealing with replacement card issues.
- Two different types of claim forms – The settlement contemplates the ability to elect either a documented or undocumented claim. Documented claims get priority in payment. From a defendant’s perspective, undocumented claims are problematic, because they are susceptible to fraud and abuse. From a consumer’s perspective, having to document claims is an added aggravation, on top of the aggravation of having had to deal with the impact of the breach in the first place. This structure offers a compromise that permits undocumented claims, but ensures that those claims that are documented will be paid first.
As a practical matter, given the size of the fund, it is likely that there will be plenty of money to pay all documented claims and all plausible undocumented claims. In fact, in view of past settlements, it is extraordinarily unlikely that the amount of all legitimate claims will get even close to the $10 million available in the fund. In the Heartland Payment Systems settlement, for example, arising out of an incident that impacted 130 million card holder accounts, the number of claims for reimbursement amounted to a grand total of $1925. (See Judge Rosenthal’s Order in Heartland Payment Systems). This miniscule claims amount was due undoubtedly to a lack of public familiarity with Heartland (a payment processor) as a brand and with the incident itself, two things that are certainly not true of Target, and claims rates in other settlements have certainly been higher despite having much smaller numbers of potential class members. However, various media outlets have quoted a RAND Corporation researcher as estimating that less than $1 million of the $10 million fund will be claimed (see, for example, this article by Jason Abbruzzese at Mashable).
If he’s right, expect a fight ahead on what should happen with the $9M in unclaimed funds which, according to the agreement, “shall be distributed by the Settlement Administrator as directed by the Court.” Cy pres anyone?
16th Annual Class Actions Institute In Review – Session 1 – “Holy Cow! This Year the Courts Said What?!”
Posted in Class Action Trends, CLE Programs, tagged 23(b)(2), 23(b)(3), amchem, burden of proof, CAFA, class action, class certification, collective, commonality, daubert, dukes, expert, fjc, FLSA, genesis, heartland, injunictive, institute, issue certification, lahav. coffee, mcreynolds, medical monitoring, monetary relief, posner, predominance, preponderance, statistical evidence, symczyk, trial by formula, windsor on October 31, 2012| 1 Comment »
This is the first in what will be six posts summarizing my notes of the six presentations at the ABA’s 16th Annual Class Actions Institute held last Thursday in Chicago. The National Institute sets the gold standard for class action conferences, and this year was no exception. Program Chair Daniel Karon and the rest of the organizing committee did an excellent job selecting six of the most timely and relevant topics facing class action practitioners today. As always, the list of panelists was a veritable who’s who in the class action field. If you ever have the opportunity to attend this annual conference, I highly recommend it.
As has become the custom at the National Institute, Columbia Law Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. kicked off this year’s program with a comprehensive and insightful summary of the year’s key developments in class action law. This year’s presentation saw what has been a hit solo act turn into an even better duet, as Professor Coffee shared the stage with Connecticut Law Professor Alexandra Lahav. The session was titled “Holy Cow! This Year the Courts Said What?!” A Brief History of this Year’s Developments in Class Action Jurisprudence. Attendees were also treated to a comprehensive, 179-page summary of the year in class actions by Professors Coffee and Lahav entitled The New Class Action Landscape: Trends and Developments in Class Certification and Related Topics.
The first part of Professor Coffee’s presentation covered each of the class action-related cases on the U.S. Supreme Court’s docket this term. Here is a list of those cases with some of Professor Coffee’s insights:
- Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen, Inc., 660 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2011) – Amgen raises the question whether the plaintiff must establish the materiality of an alleged false statement at the class certification stage of a securities fraud class action. Professor Coffee believes that this case is a close call, but whichever way it comes out, it does not threaten to end securities class action litigation as we know it.
- Behrend v. Comcast Corporation, 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011) – In Behrend, the Court could decide whether a trial court must perform a full Daubert analysis of expert testimony offered in support of or in opposition to class certification. The case raises the question, at least in the antitrust context, whether the plaintiff must present a formal damages model or whether the mere possibility of common proof is enough.
- Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 656 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2011) – This is a wage and hour case under the FLSA, which has a different procedure than Rule 23. FLSA claims are more accurately characterized as collective actions, rather than class action. The issue is whether a settlement offer for the full amount of the named plaintiff’s FLSA claim can moot the claim and prevent the case from proceeding on a collective basis, a concept also known as “picking off.” One of the arguments that has been raised is that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed as improvident granted, so it is unclear whether the Court will actually enter a substantive ruling.
- Knowles v. The Standard Fire Insurance Company, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130077 (W.D. Ark. December 2, 2011) – This case raises the question whether a plaintiff can plead around CAFA removal jurisdiction by stipulating to less than $5 million in damages on behalf of the putative class. Professor Coffee felt confident in making the prediction that the defendant will win. He points to dicta in the Court’s recent decision in Smith v. Bayer Corporation calling into question whether a plaintiff can do anything to bind the members of a putative class before it is certified.
Professor Coffee then went on to highlight some of the big developments in the lower courts from over the past year, which include:
The proper burden of proof to be applied at class certification. The circuits are split on this issue, with some applying a preponderance of the evidence standard and others simply requiring a rigorous analysis with no particular evidentiary standard.
Treatment of expert testimony. The federal district courts continue to resist resolving a battle of the experts at the class certification stage, but dicta from the Supreme Court in Dukes, as well as holdings by several of the circuits, are putting increasing pressure on the federal courts to perform a Daubert analysis (and the Court could resolve this issue for good in Behrend).
Class Arbitration Waivers. Some lower courts, especially the Second Circuit, continue to carve out exceptions to the Supreme Court’s ruling favoring arbitration agreements in Concepcion. One key issue is whether a class arbitration waiver may still be held unconscionable as a matter of federal law. Professor Coffee quipped that the Second Circuit will only change if the Supreme Court “stuffs it down their throat.” While unconscionability under state law is no longer a viable argument against enforcing an arbitration clause, clauses with fee-shifting provisions continue to be susceptible to attack.
Settlement Only and Limited Fund Classes. There is a lower court trend in permitting certification in settlement classes in cases that could not be certified as class actions in contested cases, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s opinion in Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997). The primary justification tends to be that any individualized issues of fact in the case went to manageability, which is no longer an issue in the settlement context. In cases where courts have found that individualized issues impact both predominance and manageability, settlement classes have continued to be rejected.
Partial Certification. The question of issue certification has been one of the hottest trends in the federal courts in the wake of Dukes. Professor Coffee pointed out that the resolution of whether courts allow partial certification tends to be determined whether the fact of certification creates an extortionate threat to settle the case.
Class Action Settlements. If you read just one class certification decision this year, Professor Coffee recommends Judge Rosenthal’s memorandum opinion in In re: Heartland Payment Systems, Inc. Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, MDL No. 09-2046 (S.D. Tex. March 20, 2012), which has a well-organized, step-by-step analysis of the approval of a class action settlement.
Professor Lahav focused her remarks on what has been happening in the lower courts in response to the three key aspects of the Court’s decision in Dukes: 1) the “new commonality” requirement; 2) the rejection of the use of Rule 23(b)(2) to recover individualized money damages; and 3) the rejection of “trial by formula,” of the use of statistical sampling to solve individualized damages problems.
The “new commonality”. Among Professor Lahav’s key observations was that in the Title VII context, there must be a policy, but if there is an identifiable policy, the courts will allow discretionary elements of that policy to be attacked. This trend is best exemplified by Judge Posner’s decision in McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. As many commentators predicted, Plaintiffs have had better success after Dukes by narrowing the geographic scope of discrimination claims. This has also been true in the consumer context. In the civil rights context, allegations of systemic constitutional violations have had success when the courts have focused on the systemic nature of the practice, but not when courts have focused on the effects of a systemic practice on the prospective class members. In general, there has been an increasing reliance on issues classes to overcome individualized issues that might destroy commonality or predominance.
Rule 23(b)(2) and monetary damages. The majority opinion in Dukes raised the question whether there can ever be a class with monetary damages. None of the circuit courts have provided further guidance on when damages might be sufficiently “incidental” to still allow relief. One area that has seen mixed results since Dukes is the area of medical monitoring class actions, where the remedy sought is medical monitoring of the possible health effects of a toxic exposure but the cost of monitoring can vary from person to person. Professor Lahav pointed to the Third Circuit’s decision in Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., No. 10-2108 (3d Cir., Aug. 25, 2011), as potentially supporting arguments on both sides. Hybrid class actions, where classes are certified based on both Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3), are becoming increasingly common, especially in the Title VII context. One unanswered question is whether damages claims are precluded if a Rule 23(b)(2) class is certified but not successful.
Statistical evidence and “trial by formula.” Statistical evidence is still accepted in contexts where it has been accepted traditionally, e.g. civil rights, disparate impact, and antitrust cases. It is not allowed in cases where the defendant can raise individualized defenses. One proposed solution is, again, issues classes, but this creates a class action funding problem – How do lawyers get paid?
Professor Lahav also revisited statistical trends in class actions, focusing primarily on data compiled by the Federal Judicial Center in 2008 which analyzed the impact of the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). She made the key point that statistical data on class action trends has been severely lacking since the FJC study, making updated empirical analysis of class action trends difficult.