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Posts Tagged ‘public policy’

Brian Wolfman, Co-director of the Institute for Public Representation at Georgetown University Law Center, has two excellent recent posts on Public Citizen’s Consumer Law and Policy Blog that provide food for thought on the need for class action reform, and the best way to achieve reform if it is needed.

In the most recent of the two articles, Paying the Lawyer’s Expenses in Class Actions, Wolfman discusses the social importance of allowing plaintiffs’ attorneys to recover their reasonable costs incurred in successfully pursuing a class action settlement or judgment, but discusses a recent case in which two attorneys from a prominent plaintiffs’ firm were sanctioned for having claimed reimbursement for fancy dinners and first class airline tickets.  Wolfman warns about the negative impact that this type of conduct has on public perception of class actions, and makes the valuable point that even minor abuses of the system for personal gain threatens to bring scrutiny to the class action mechanism more generally, which limits access to justice that class actions may provide in meritorious cases.

In an earlier article, Important 7th Circuit Decision Rejecting Shareholder Derivative Suit, Wolfman applauds Judge Frank Easterbrook’s opinion throwing out the settlement of a shareholder derivative suit after finding that the underlying suit lacked merit and should be dismissed.  Wolfman makes the point that rather than approving a settlement that provides little or no benefit to class members on the grounds that the merits of the claims are weak, the better solution from a public policy perspective is to dismiss the case entirely.  He sums up this point concisely, “[a]n obviously meritless case should not benefit the lawyers and no one else.”

The two articles illustrate two important conceptual principles on which many consumer advocates and corporate interests may find themselves in complete agreement: First, it is the potential for abuse of class actions, and not the class action mechanism itself, that often provides the basis for legitimate criticism.  Second, courts can preserve the fairness and integrity of class action mechanism without the need for systematic reform simply by applying common sense restraints in the face of clear abuse.  I think that both of these points are correct as a matter of principle, and they are both eloquently illustrated by Wolfman’s posts.

My only question is whether the idea of preventing abuse through the application by the courts of common sense constraints, while pure in theory, is truly realistic in practice.  It only works to the extent that all judges will act as carefully and thoughtfully as the judges in the two cases highlighted above.  If courts do not dismiss all frivolous cases when a defendant files a motion to dismiss, what choice does a defendant have as a practical matter but to consider buying peace on the best terms possible, which often means paying off the lawyers at the expense of a class that the defendant doesn’t believe was harmed anyway?  And, if some courts continue let frivolous claims proceed in the hopes that the parties will settle, or turn a blind eye to small excesses in fee and cost petitions, then basic human nature says that some (but certainly not all) plaintiffs’ lawyers will continue to commit these abuses, and some (but not all) defense lawyers will play along to serve their own interests.  In the end, the cynic will question whether relying on the diligence and intellectual honesty of the judiciary and the professional integrity of the bar is a realistic path to reform.

On the other hand, for those of us who are practitioners and not policymakers, professional responsibility, appeal to reason, diligence, and intellectual honesty are the only tools we have at our disposal at maintaining the integrity of the judicial process.

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Class arbitration waivers are contract provisions that require disputes be submitted to arbitration but also expressly preclude the arbitration from being conducted on a representative or class basis.  Class arbitration waivers have been a hot topic in class action litigation over the past few years, as some courts have found that in certain contexts that the are unenforceable in violation of public policy.

Yesterday, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court in In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, No. 06-1871-cv.  This is the second decision by the Second Circuit in the case finding that the class arbitration waiver provision at issue was unenforceable.  The first decision, In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 554 F.3d 300 (2009), was issued by a panel that included future Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor.  (See this February 2009 CAB entry discussing the decision).  Last May, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the decision, and remanded for reconsideration in light of its recent decision in Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).

A 2-judge panel, sans now-Justice Sotomayor, issued the decision on reconsideration yesterday.  The court found that Stolt-Nielsen did not change its conclusion.  The rationale is best summarized in the following excerpt:

Stolt-Nielsen states that parties cannot be forced to engage in a class arbitration absent a contractual agreement to do so. It does not follow, as Amex urges, that a contractual clause barring class arbitration is per se enforceable. Indeed, our prior holding focused not on whether the plaintiffs’ contract provides for class arbitration, but on whether the class action waiver is enforceable when it would effectively strip plaintiffs of their ability to prosecute alleged antitrust violations.

Slip op. at 11.

The Court went on to hold that the arbitration provision at issue was not enforceable because, it found, the facts in the record established that having to pursue the antitrust claims at issue in the case would be prohibitively expensive without using the class action device.  Therefore, the court reasoned, the contract provision was void for public policy reasons, as a matter of law.  In rejecting the argument that Stolt-Nielsen prohibits the invalidation of arbitration provisions for public policy reasons, the court stated:

While Stolt-Nielsen plainly rejects using public policy as a means for divining the parties’ intent, nothing in Stolt-Nielsen bars a court from using public policy to find contractual language void. We agree with plaintiffs that “[t]o infer from Stolt-Nielsen’s narrow ruling on contractual construction that the Supreme Court meant to imply that an arbitration is valid and enforceable where, as a demonstrated factual matter, it prevents the effective vindication of federal rights would be to presume that the Stolt-Nielsen court meant to overrule or drastically limit its prior precedent.” (Plaintiffs’ Supp. Brief, p. 7) Following the Stolt-Nielsen decision, our court reached a similar conclusion in considering a different iteration of the issue: whether class action waivers are unconscionable as a matter of state law.

Id. at 21.

The long-term impact of the Second Circuit’s decision is unclear, especially since the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion is expected soon.  (See this November 17, 2010 CAB Entry recapping the oral arguments in AT&T Mobility).  However, AT&T Mobility involves issues of federal preemption and the power of the state courts to find class arbitration waivers unenforceable.  Therefore, even a decision favorable to the defendant in AT&T Mobility may not prevent future federal courts from applying the Second Circuit’s reasoning in invalidating class arbitration waivers.

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