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Posts Tagged ‘scalia’

The United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, No. 11-864 today.  In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the class of cable subscribers had been improperly certified.  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reasoned that the expert testimony offered by the plaintiff to show that antitrust damages were capable of class-wide proof addressed alleged damages that did not logically flow from the plaintiff’s theory of class-wide liability.  The majority held that the trial court had erred by refusing to consider questions concerning the expert testimony on damages that might overlap with the “merits,” while the Third Circuit had erred by accepting the plaintiffs’ contention that it had a class-wide theory of damages through expert testimony without actually scrutinizing the factual basis for that contention:

The Court of Appeals simply concluded that respondents “provided a method to measure and quantify damages on a classwide basis,” finding it unnecessary to decide “whether the methodology [was] a just and reasonable inference or speculative.” 655 F. 3d, at 206.  Under that logic, at the class-certification stage any method of measurement is acceptable so long as it can be applied classwide, no matter how arbitrary the measurements may be.  Such a proposition would reduce Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement to a nullity.

The dissenting Justices would have dismissed the writ of certiorari as having been improvidently granted.  The dissent’s criticism of the majority’s holding has more to do with the procedural posture of the case and the methodology used by the majority in reaching its factual conclusions than with the legal class certification concepts underlying the majority’s reasoning.  In particular, the dissent faulted the majority for having changed the issue on review after the conclusion of briefing and took issue with the majority’s analysis of the factual basis for the expert’s opinions.

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In what would have been bigger class action news yesterday had the Supreme Court not issued its decision in Amgen, the Court also heard oral argument in class arbitration case, American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, No. 12-133 (click case title for a link to the transcript).  The primary issue presented is whether the “federal substantive law of arbitrability” may be invoked to invalidate an arbitration agreement in a case involving federal law claims.  The case will test the limits of the Supreme Court’s holding in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state laws prohibiting class arbitration waivers). 

It is clear from the questions posed by the Justices that there are certain members of the Court (namely Justice Scalia, author of Concepcion) who remain steadfast in their belief that arbitration agreements that prohibit class claims are enforceable, period, and that there is another faction of the court that has serious doubts about the use of an arbitration agreement to effectively foreclose a litigant from obtaining any meaningful procedure for vindicating his or her rights.  Whether this case follows Concepcion in solidifying the enforceability of class arbitration waivers or carves out an exception will likely depend on a few swing votes in the middle.

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The Supreme Court has issued its opinion in one of the most highly anticipated class action-related cases on the docket this term.  The result in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, No. 11-1085, slip op. (U.S., Feb. 27, 2013) is not surprising given the content and tone of the questioning at oral argument.  In an 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Ginsberg, the Court held that the plaintiff in a securities fraud case based on a fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance does not have to prove materiality of the fraudulent statement or omission at the class certification stage.  Because materiality is a common question capable of resolution simultaneously for the entire class, the majority reasoned, it does not have to be proven at the class certification stage.  Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy dissented.

Amgen is an important decision in the securities fraud context because it addresses the lingering question of whether any special prerequisites exist in certifying a securities fraud class action that aren’t required in certifying other types of class actions.  Like the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011), Amgen will probably have an impact beyond the securities fraud context.  In the context of class certification decisions more broadly, the opinion will be almost certainly be cited as clarifying the distinction between issues impacting the elements of class certification, which must be resolved at the class certification phase, and merits issues, which can wait until trial to be resolved.

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According to Pete Kasperowicz at The Hill’s Floor Action Blog, Senator Al Franken (D-Minn.) and Representative Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn.) have introduced legislation in Congress intended to reverse limitations on employment discrimination class actions recognized in the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes

A fact sheet available on Senator Franken’s official website describes the key provisions of the bill as follows:

The Equal Employment Opportunity Restoration Act will restore workers’ ability to challenge discriminatory employment practices on a class-wide basis. It adds to Title 28 of the U.S. Code a new section 4201, which does the following:

  • Section 4201(a) creates a new judicial procedure – called “group actions” – that workers can use when bringing employment discrimination cases. The requirements for establishing a group action are the same as the pre-Dukes requirements for maintaining a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—namely, clarifying that the merits of the case need not be proven to certify the group action.
  • Section 4201(b) provides that group actions can be used regardless of whether the group is challenging an objective employment practice, a subjective employment practice, or a mixed employment practice (such as the use of a written test to qualify for an interview).  It also provides that employers’ written anti-discrimination policies can be considered as a defense to certification only insofar as the employer demonstrates that the policy actually has been implemented in practice.
  • Section 4201(c) says that the group actions authorized by this section are subject to the same procedural requirements as class actions authorized by Rule 23. These include notice and opt-out requirements. This section also preserves the application of the Class Action Fairness Act and the availability of appeals.
  • Section 4201(d) says that courts can use statistical analyses and any other procedures they deem necessary to provide justice to prevailing plaintiffs.

It does not appear from Senator Franken’s fact sheet that the bill has significant bipartisan support, and having just been introduced, there is no telling how far it will go towards becoming law in its present form.  However, we’ll keep an eye on any future developments here at CAB.

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The Baker Hostetler Employment Class Action Blog is constantly putting out quality content, but they have two new recent posts that I would especially recommend to my readers.  They include:

  • This February 6 post from John Lewis discussing the impacts, both on employment cases and otherwise, of the Second Circuit’s recent Amex III decision.
  • This February 6 Post from Greg Mersol discussing a recent federal court decision holding that the pleading standards articulated in Iqbal and Twombly do not apply to affirmative defenses in class actions.
  • This January 20 post from John Lewis discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent pro-arbitration opinion in CompuCredit Corp v. Greenwood.

Even if you aren’t an employment lawyer, I would strongly suggest adding www.employmentclassactionreport.com to your list of favorites!

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Many commentators correctly that the decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes would be favorable to business interests.  However, unlike the Court’s earlier decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the decision does not necessarily threaten to sound a death knell for class actions or even a particular category of class actions.  Instead, the decision merely clarifies the standards on which future class actions are to be evaluated in the federal courts, but it does so in a way that is likely to impact class actions in many areas of the law outside of the employment law context.  Here are some of the key issues on which the opinion will undoubtedly be cited in the future, and some thoughts on the potential impact of the decision on each issue.

1) Standard of review  – The majority’s decision clarifies a long-standing misconception about the ability of a federal court to consider questions relating to the merits of a case in the class certification phase.  For more than 30 years, plaintiffs’ counsel and many courts have cited the Court’s opinion in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) as prohibiting any examination of the plaintiffs’ claims on the merits at the class certification phase.  Consistent with the majority trend in the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. confirms that a court should consider and resolve any issues of fact that are necessary to determine whether one or more elements of Rule 23 are satisfied, regardless of whether those issues may overlap or be identical to one or more issues to be decided in ruling on the merits of the plaintiff’s claims.

2) Evaluation of Expert Testimony – The majority decision makes clear that it is appropriate for a federal court to conduct a Daubert analysis to consider the reliability and helpfulness of expert witness opinions at the class certification phase.  It is no longer sufficient for a plaintiff to present expert testimony and then argue that the Court may find that testimony reliable at some later point in the proceedings.  Again, in keeping with te trend among the federal circuit courts, the Court’s analysis in Wal-mart Stores, Inc. makes clear that the reliability and relevance of expert testimony proposed as “common proof” should be evaluated before granting class certification.

3) Use of Statistical Evidence in Support of Class Certification – The majority’s decision leaves open the possibility that statistical evidence might be used in establishing the existence of common proof in certain cases, but it sets a high standard for when proffered statistical evidence can be considered as adequate proof of the existence of “common issue.”  Significantly, Part III of Justice Scalia’s opinion, which was joined by all 9 justices, disapproves of the “Trial by Formula” approach to class actions, in which a sample of claims is tried on the merits, and the results of that sample are then applied proportionally to the claims of the entire class.

4) Certification of Claims Seeking Monetary Relief Under FRCP 23(b)(2) – This is perhaps the most uncontroversial aspect of the opinion in that part of the unanimous holding of the Court.  The Court’s holding is also straightforward, at least conceptually: claims for monetary relief may not be certified under FRCP 23(b)(2) unless they are merely incidental to injunctive or declaratory relief being requested on behalf of the class as a whole.  However, the devil may be in the details, as future courts (especially outside the employment law context) will be left with the task of defining what monetary relief is “incidental” to injunctive or declaratory relief and what is not.

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In response yesterday’s entry discussing Daniel Fisher’s article on the potential impacts of Concepcion, I got one of the best comments that I’ve ever received on this site.  It comes from Portland complex injury and consumer class action attorney David Sugerman, who blogs at www.davidsugerman.com.  Of course, I disagree with just about every word of it, but with imagery like a bunch of corporate fat cats “fixing to celebrate the opening of the all-you-can-eat trough of greed,” I could not help but re-post it here:

I’m amused. As I said to defense counsel at a large multi-national firm, I guessed that midway through the second glass of champagne, the defense bar realized it had a real problem. He is apparently looking for a new job or to transition into other areas of practice.

Your one concrete example–retail sales–is, as you know, a less viable class because of problems of ascertainment, notice, locating the class, providing notice and obtaining and distributing relief. And not all retail sales cases survive. You likely recall the Gateway case some years ago with the forced mandatory arbitration clause in the paperwork in the box that was deemed accepted upon registration?

I love the concerted talking points in the defense bar that these cases are not done. Those of us who represent consumers know better.

We also know the torrent about to be unleashed when consumers can no longer take concerted action to stop nickel and diming on high-volume, small amount claims. AT&T, Comcast, banks, utilities, credit card companies are fixing to celebrate the opening of the all-you-can-eat trough of greed.

The argument that Congressional or Executive action *might* change things proves too much. Absent such action, consumer class cases are pretty much done. The argument also illustrates the crass overreaching in SCOTUS’ opinion, with views on federalism and statutory construction that are as breathtaking as the Citizens United case.

This is really not a problem for me because I handle a wide range of consumer and plaintiff problems. But my colleagues in high-priced defense firms who defend consumer class actions for a living are likely to have problems.

So no, if I were a high end defense attorney, I wouldn’t take much comfort in Forbes view or the talking points. It’s going to get bleak out there.

Lest you doubt my dire predictions, let’s set a wager for 12 months from the decision on how many consumer class actions have been filed, how many layoffs in the defense industry, or some other agreed-upon metric that we can revisit next year.

Ok, David, friendly banter on.

First, I must say that I don’t know a single defense lawyer who owns a private jet, but I know several plaintiffs’ lawyers who do, so all this talk about “high-priced” defense firms rings a little hollow to me.

Second, defense lawyers will have jobs for as long as there are plaintiffs’ lawyers around to file lawsuits, and somehow I don’t see the plaintiffs’ bar throwing in the towel this easily.  What you may see is simply a shift in the kinds of class actions that get filed in the future, or the industries that are targeted.  I say “targeted” because in my experience trends in consumer class actions are more often driven by the creativity of the entrepreneurial trial bar than by any epidemic of corporate greed.  Don’t get me wrong, I’m not saying there aren’t well-publicized scandals involving an epidemic of corporate greed (See Enron), but they tend to generate securities or ERISA class actions, not consumer class actions.

Finally, I’ll wager you, although not for money.  Only for pride.  (I’m not made of money after all, I’m just a defense lawyer).  I’ll bet that not only don’t we see a decrease, but we’ll actually see an increase in consumer class actions over the next year.  Sort of like the rash of class actions filed just before CAFA took effect.  I’m not sure at this moment how we’ll measure this, but I’d imagine that there’s a consulting firm out there (no doubt worried about the effect Concepcion is going to have on its own bottom line) planning just the kind of research we need.

So, if you’re a consulting firm looking for a project, we’ve got a job for you (pro bono, of course)…

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