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Posts Tagged ‘shady grove’

Don’t miss the upcoming Strafford webinar on recent developments in TCPA class actions, scheduled for March 20.  My colleague Justin Winquist and I will provide commentary from the defense perspective, while Keith J. Keogh and John G. Watts will offer the plaintiffs’ viewpoint.  For more information about the program and to register, click this link.  Here’s a brief synopsis of the program:

TCPA consumer and privacy class action litigation remains steady following the 2012 milestone U.S. Supreme Court case Mims v. Arrow Financial Services.

The Mims case opened the door for plaintiffs’ attorneys to file TCPA class actions in state or federal court, even where diversity jurisdiction does not exist. Since Mims, defendants have tested state law limitations on federal claims and whether state or federal statutes of limitations defenses apply.

TCPA claims challenging text messages to cellphones are also on the rise, forcing courts to consider how to interpret the Act in light of new technology.

Listen as our authoritative panel of class action attorneys explains the latest trends in telephone and fax advertising under the TCPA, highlighting key issues of federal jurisdiction, state law limitations, and how courts are adapting their decisions to new technology. The panel will provide plaintiff and defense counsel with best practices for litigating in this rapidly-changing area of law.

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One of the hottest substantive areas in consumer class actions these days is litigation under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S .C. § 227, sometimes called the “fax blast” statute, which prohibits unsolicited faxes and automated calls for the purpose of commercial solicitation.  The TCPA has a statutory penalty provision that allows consumers to recover $500 for each violation.  The ability to collect far more in statutory penalties than the actual damages caused by a given violation makes TCPA violations an appealing target for enterprising plaintiffs’ class action lawyers.  The aggregation of thousands of claims together can create huge monetary exposure for defendants and the potential for easy settlements and the large contingent fees that comes with it.  In this way, the TCPA is similar to other laws with statutory penalties, such as the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA), which provides for statutory penalties against a company that produces credit card receipts with too much information on them.

Although it is a federal statute, the TCPA does not provide for federal court jurisdiction in private actions to enforce it.  TCPA class actions may only be filed in or removed to the federal courts if there is diversity jurisdiction under CAFA

This has naturally given rise to the question of whether state laws limiting class actions, such as § 901(b) of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules, which prohibits class actions for claims seeking statutory penalties, are applicable in federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction over TCPA claims.   Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals said yes.  After the Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of Shady Grove, the Second Circuit said yes again, reasoning that the TCPA’s language allowing private enforcement “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State” gave the states broad power to determine how TCPA actions may be prosecuted within their borders.  The Third Circuit has disagreed with this conclusion, holding that State limitations on class actions do not apply in TCPA class actions filed in the federal courts.  Given the Third Circuit’s view, defendants in at least some jurisdictions may have a strong incentive to oppose federal jurisdiction in TCPA cases.

Another question that arises from the peculiar federalist nature of the TCPA is whether a state or federal statute of limitations applies.  Earlier this week, in Giovanniello v. ALM Media LLC, the Second Circuit answered this question and held that a shorter state law limitations period applied rather than the 4-year federal catchall provision. 

Several recent decisions have highlighted a split among both the state and federal the courts about whether TCPA claims should be permitted to be brought as class actions at all.  Of particular note is the recent decision of the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division in Local Baking Products, Inc. v. Kosher Bagel Munch, Inc., which provides an excellent survey of the various state and federal court decisions on both sides of the issue.  The court in Local Baking Products ultimately decided that class certification of TCPA claims was not appropriate. It reasoned that class actions are not a superior procedure for enforcing the TCPA because Congress had made statutory penalties available so that individuals would be incentivized to pursue vindication of their rights in individual actions in small claims or other state courts.  In addition to lack of superiority, a common reason offered by other courts for rejecting class certification is that the question of whether faxes or calls were authorized is too individualized for common questions to predominate.

Earlier this month, however, the Supreme Court of Kansas upheld a lower court’s decision granting class certification in a TCPA case.  In Critchfield Physical Therapy v. The Taranto Group, Inc., the court rejected both the argument that individual actions in small claims court would be superior to a class action and the argument that the question of consent was too individualized.  In addition, the court rejected the argument that class actions would not be superior in light of the threat that aggregating thousands of individual statutory penalties together could create an “annihilating” judgment against the defendant that would be disproportionate to any harm to the class.  A similar argument had been successful in a FACTA case in California federal court, but later reversed by the Ninth Circuit in Bateman v. American Multi Cinema, Inc.

Meanwhile, while a bill has been introduced in the U.S. house to “modernize” the TCPA by permitting certain informational robo-calls to be made to mobile phones, among other things, the bill would not modify the private enforcement provisions of the statute.

One quandary facing courts and counsel in TCPA class actions is how to give notice to consumers if a class is certified.  Last month, a Madison County, Illinois judge ordered that notice of a class action for unsolicited faxes under the TCPA should be disseminated by. . . 

. . . you guessed it . . .  

fax.

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As I noted in my post a few weeks ago for the SCOTUSBlog class action symposium, one issue to which I’m paying particularly close attention these days, particularly in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Shady Grove, Concepcion, Bayer and Dukes, is whether the state court class certification standards begin to diverge from increasingly more exacting federal standards. 

A recent article in the Wisconsin Lawyer caught my eye as a case in point for the potential divergence of state and federal class action standards.  A Call to Reform Wisconsin’s Class-Action Statute, authored by Paul Benson, Joe Olson & Ben Kaplan of the Milwaukee firm Michael Best, discusses the brief and arcane language of Wisconsin’s class action statute (Section 803.08 of the Wisconsin Statutes), which reads, in its entirety:

When the question before the court is one of a common or general interest of many persons or when the parties are very numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole.

Benson, Olsen and Kaplan point out in their article that although the courts have generally looked to case law interpreting federal Rule 23 in deciding whether class certification is proper under the state rule, the broad statutory language leaves state trial courts with broad discretion in deciding what standards to apply in a particular case.  This, they argue, leaves the state rule open to uncertainty of application, inconsistent decisions, and forum shopping.   They propose that the state rule be reformed so that it more closely mirrors the federal rule.

It remains to be seen whether states like Wisconsin with ill-defined class action rules will become battleground for class action litigation, where plaintiffs can attempt to avoid the more rigorous standards now required in the federal courts. Even assuming that CAFA and other jurisdictional issues could be overcome, there could be a variety of practical reasons why plaintiffs’ lawyers would not want to pursue class action litigation in the Wisconsin courts.  However, Wisconsin’s broadly-worded class action rule provides at least a possible inducement to pursue litigation there.

In other words, for potential class action defendants (and in observance of National Talk Like a Pirate Day), Ye maye want to considarrrr steerrrin’ clear o’ Wisconsin, me maties!

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After the all the activity in the Supreme Court during the October 2010 term, why would anyone want to talk about a decision from the October 2009 term?  Isn’t that kind of like showing off your new Blackberry Curve the day after they unveil the iPhone 4?  I prefer to think about it this way–it’s like what they say about the NFL draft.  Sure, it’s fun to read all of Mel Kiper’s draft grades the next day, but you won’t really know how your team did until you have time to see the players perform on the field.

All these obscure metaphors are my way of introducing an upcoming live phone/web seminar in which I’ll be presenting entitled “Filing Class Actions in Federal Court After Shady Grove” scheduled for Thursday, July 14, 1:00pm-2:30pm EDT.  Here’s a synopsis of the program:

The Supreme Court’s Shady Grove ruling held that Rule 23 preempts state laws that otherwise bar statutory claims from being brought as class actions. Many believed an increase in class actions filed in federal court, particularly in the consumer protection and antitrust arenas would result.

One year later, the impact of Shady Grove on federal court filings remains unclear, mostly due to ambiguities in the Court’s decision and the differing plurality and concurring opinions regarding the standard for deciding which state-law restrictions do not apply in federal court actions.

The lower courts’ struggles to apply these different tests have resulted in divergent applications of Shady Grove. Nonetheless, plaintiffs and defendants can glean guidance from these rulings for arguing their positions regarding the applicability of a state-law restriction in federal court.

My fellow panelists and I developed this program to analyze the U.S. Supreme Court’s Shady Grove decision and discuss how lower courts have applied the ruling. We will offer guidance for practitioners to argue their positions on whether particular state-law prohibitions on class action claims should apply in federal diversity cases.

We will offer our perspectives and guidance on these and other critical questions:

  • Has the Shady Grove decision provided plaintiffs with additional opportunities for class action litigation?
  • How have lower courts applied Shady Groves‘ divergent tests for deciding which state laws restrictions will not apply in federal court actions?
  • Have there been any rulings since Shady Grove which dispensed with the state law restriction on class action claims?

After our presentations, we will engage in a live question and answer session with participants — so we can answer your questions about these important issues directly.

I hope you’ll join us.

For more information or to register >

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As 2010 winds down, it’s time to review the key developments in class action law.  It was an especially busy year for the federal courts, and in particular the U.S. Supreme Court, on issues impacting class action practice.  Here, in chronological order, are 10 key developments from the year that was:

  1. January 5 – In In re Baycol Products Litigation, the Eighth Circuit follows the Seventh Circuit’s lead in upholding the right of a federal court to enjoin a putative statewide class action from proceeding where a federal court had already denied class certification in a case involving substantially similar claims.  (See CAB entries dated January 7 and January 12).
  2. February 23 – In a decision that will impact many class actions removed under the Class Action Fairness Act, the Supreme Court adopts the “nerve center test” as the standard for determining corporate citizenship, in Hertz Corp. v. Friend.  (See CAB entry dated March 2)
  3. March 31 – The Supreme Court holds that states may not regulate the types of claims that may be filed as class actions in the federal courts, in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.  (See CAB entry dated April 8)
  4. April 7 – In American Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, the Seventh Circuit holds that a trial court must rule on challenges to the admissibility of expert testimony relevant to class certification before deciding whether a class may be certified.  (See CAB entry dated May 4)
  5. April 26 – The Ninth Circuit issues its decision in Dukes v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc., adopting rigorous class certification standards similar to those previously adopted by the Second Circuit in In re IPO Securities Litigation, 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006), but nonetheless certifying under FRCP 23(b)(2), what has been called the largest employment discrimination class action in history.
  6. April 27 – The Supreme Court seemingly puts an end, for all practical purposes, to the concept of class arbitration by holding that a defendant could not be compelled to defend an arbitration on a class basis where the arbitration clause did not expressly provide for class arbitration, in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp.  (See CAB entry dated May 11).
  7. June 24 – In Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the Supreme Court deals a fatal blow to “foreign-cubed” class actions, holding that § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 does not allow for fraud claims involving transactions on foreign exchanges that occurred outside the United States. (See case summary at SCOTUS blog).
  8. July 19, October 20 – An Eleventh Circuit panel issues a controversial decision in Cappuccitti v. DirecTV, Inc., severely restricting CAFA removal jurisdiction to cases where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 with respect to at least one class member, but later reverses itself in an October 15 opinion.  (See Guest Post from Eric Jon Taylor and Jon Chally at CAFA Law Blog for more on the first decision and this October 20 CAB entry on the second decision).
  9. November 9 – Supreme Court hears oral argument in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, in which the Court considers whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state law holding a class arbitration waiver unconscionable.  (See CAB fsummary of oral argument dated November 17).
  10. December 6 – Supreme Court grants certiorari in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, to decide the issue of whether a claim for monetary relief can be certified under FRCP 23(b)(2).  (See CAB entry dated December 7).

Just considering the cases still awaiting ruling before the Supreme Court, 2011 promises to be another exciting year in the world of class actions.  Happy New Year to all!

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I’m embarrassingly late in posting a link to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., No. 08-1008, slip op. (S. Ct., March 31, 2010) in which the Court held that a New York state rule prohibiting class actions to recover statutory penalties did not apply in a case filed in federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). 

Anyone who thinks that class action jurisprudence can be predicted based on perceived political leanings of  the Justices should take a look at the composition of the various factions of the Court that agreed to different parts of the plurality opinion:

SCALIA, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II–A, in which ROB-ERTS, C. J., and STEVENS, THOMAS, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined, an opin-ion with respect to Parts II–B and II–D, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part II–C, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and, THOMAS, J., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined.

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