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Posts Tagged ‘wal-mart’

Robert H. Klonoff, Dean of the Lewis and Clark Law School and author of the quintessential class action compendium, Class Actions and Other Multi-Party Litigation in a Nutshell, has authored an excellent research paper entitled The Decline of Class Actions.  The paper which will be published in Volume 90 of the Washington University Law Review, but a draft is now available for free download at SSRN.  Dean Klonoff asserts that recent trends in class action decisions, which make it more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain class certification, have undermined the “compensation, deterrence, and efficiency” objectives underlying Rule 23.  He urges policymakers, rulemakers, and the courts to take a “more balanced approach to classwide adjudication.”

Whether or not you agree with Dean Klonoff’s criticisms from an academic point of view, the article is a must read for anyone looking for a good synopsis of the key developments in the U.S. class action law over the past several years.  From the Class Action Fairness Act to the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Dukes and Concepcion to slightly less glamorous topics such as the necessity of a precise class definition, Klonoff’s article is impressive in its comprehensive analysis of relevant recent developments.

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I’m not sure that WordPress site statististics would be admissible in a class action as proof of readers’ interest, but the recent CAB site stats do appear to show some level of interest in the topic of statistics in class actions. 

So, readers may be interested in an upcoming Strafford Publications webinar in which I will be participating on May 23, 2012, entitled Statistics in Class Action Litigation: Admissibility, Expert Witnesses and Impact of Wal-Mart v. Dukes.  For those of you who think that title sounds familiar, this is an update of a Strafford webinar held last year shortly after the Dukes decision was announced.  Find out if our predictions then were at all close to the mark. 

Here’s a link to the Strafford page for the webinar, where you can get more information and register:

http://www.straffordpub.com/products/statistics-in-class-action-litigation-admissibility-expert-witnesses-and-impact-of-wal-mart-v-dukes-2012-05-23

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For those of you interested in the topic of statistics in mass and class actions, U. Conn. Law Professor and Mass Tort Litigation Blog contributor Alexandra D. Lahav has written an academic paper on the subject in the Texas Law Review, aptly entitled The Case for “Trial by Formula.”  For Professor Lahav’s synopsis of the paper, a link to the paper, and a brief response to last week’s CAB post on the subject, see this Mass Tort Litigation Blog post.

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Editor’s Note: This is a joint post for ClassActionBlawg and the newly-launched Baker Hostetler Class Action Lawsuit Defense Blog.  Be sure to bookmark the Baker Hostetler blog at www.classactionlawsuitdefense.com for the latest in class action trends and decisions.

A common temptation in class action litigation is to fashion procedures based on “rough justice” to avoid overburdening the courts or attempting to redress alleged mass harm.  Over the past decade, as storage and computing power have increased exponentially, it has become increasingly tempting to use statistical sampling as a proxy for the actual adjudication of facts in class or mass actions.  The idea is that if the facts regarding a statistically significant subset of a class can be evaluated for a particular issue or set of issues, then the results of the evaluation of the sample can be extrapolated across the rest of the class.

One jurisdiction in particular where this approach has gained traction has been California.  There, the use of statistical sampling has been recognized for several years as a means of apportioning damages in some cases.   See Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 715 [9 Cal.Rptr.3d 544] (Bell III).   However, in recent years, plaintiffs have attempted to use statistical sampling as proof of liability, not simply as a means of apportioning damages when liability has been established or (as in Bell III) it is not contested.  This approach was harshly criticized in Part III of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, (notably, this was the portion of the Dukes opinion with which all nine justices concurred):

The Court of Appeals believed that it was possible to replace such proceedings with Trial by Formula. A sample set of the class members would be selected, as to whom liability for sex discrimination and the backpay owing as a result would be determined in depositions supervised by a master. The percentage of claims determined to be valid would then be applied to the entire remaining class, and the number of (presumptively) valid claims thus derived would be multiplied by the average backpay award in the sample set to arrive at the entire class recovery— without further individualized proceedings. [internal citation omitted].  We disapprove that novel project.

Earlier this year, in Duran v. U.S. Bank National Association, No. A125557 & A126827 (Cal. App., Feb.  6, 2012), a division of the California Court of Appeal agreed with the above-quoted dicta in Dukes and rejected an attempt to use statistical sampling to prove liability an a wage and hour class action.  The plaintiff had presented testimony from statistician Richard Drogin, who had also served as an expert for the plaintiffs in Dukes.  Drogin presented a random sampling analysis that purported to estimate the percentage of the defendant’s employees that had been misclassified for purposes of entitlement to overtime pay.  The trial court adopted a sampling approach that was modeled on (but not exactly the same as) Drogin’s proposal.  

The Court of Appeal held that the trial court’s approach was improper and that it violated defendant’s due process rights for a variety of reasons, including that 1) the use of statistics to estimate the total number of employees who had been misclassified deprived the defendant an opportunity to present relevant evidence and individualized defenses as to individual plaintiffs’ alleged misclassification; 2) the court’s statistical methodology was flawed because it arbitrarily used a sample of 20 employees without any basis for concluding that the sample was statistically significant; 3) even the use of sampling as to damages was improper because the methodology used had an unacceptably high margin of error.

The Duran opinion is worthy of careful study for anyone considering the use of statistics in class certification proceedings, both in the employment context and in other types of class actions.  The opinion examines many of the due process problems with allowing proof of liability through statistical sampling, the most significant of which is that it tends to deprive a defendant of presenting evidence in its defense that it would be able to present in an individual case.  It also provides an additional illustration of what the Supreme Court considered an improper “trial by formula” in Dukes.

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From time to time we will troll the class action blogosphere for news and information about our favorite class action topics.  Here are just a few of the recent headlines from around the web.

Complex litigation as a commodity investment? 

Hedge funds have traditionally been willing to explore new territory in the non-traditional investment sphere.  At least some appear to be finding potentially attractive opportunities in so-called Litigation Funding Companies.  LFC’s are often run by former lawyers–some with an investment or hedge fund background.  They identify potentially profitable lawsuits and agree to fund the litigation (to a point) in exchange for a percentage of the settlement.  Three Geeks and a Law Blog has an interesting multi-part series on this new trend.  Read it here.

http://www.geeklawblog.com/2012/03/rise-of-third-party-litigation-funding.html

10 ways to defend class actions using Walmart v. Dukes

Andrew Trask, class action attorney at McGuire Woods and co-author of the Class Action Playbook recently put together a list of takeaways explaining how class action defense attorneys can use Wal-mart v. Dukes.  His post links to a power point presentation he recently gave at DePaul University.  It’s a quick read and worth checking out.

http://www.classactioncountermeasures.com/uploads/file/DePaul%20-%20Defense.pdf

BP Settlement

The BP litigation in the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill off the Gulf Coast has settled for all claimants except the federal government.  The Mass Tort Litigation Blog has been providing regular updates including this post discussing what’s known about the settlement.  It appears the settlement will consist of two separate agreements. One will resolve economic claims while the other will resolve medical claims.  The Blog cites news reports explaining that “either the settlement will be paid by the $20 billion fund BP created to compensate victims or the fund will close and be replaced by a court overseen claims facility.”

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mass_tort_litigation/

Irregular transaction was not enough to show a Bank had actual knowledge of an alleged Ponzi scheme.

Race to the Bottom contributor Susan Beblavi unpacks the Eleventh Circuit’s semi-recent opinion in Lawrence v. Bank of America, D.C. Docket No. 8:09-cv-02162-VMC-TGW, 2012 LEXIS 777 (11th Cir. Jan. 11, 2012).  In that case, putative class action plaintiffs alleged the Bank of America substantially assisted in a Ponzi scheme operated by one of its account holders.  The Eleventh Circuit upheld the District court’s dismissal of the case reasoning that even though BOA authorized numerous large transactions by the account holder, the bank wasn’t required to investigate them under Florida law.  Moreover, the court found the purported red flags were too weak to infer that it was plausible that the bank had actual knowledge of the alleged scheme.  Read more at the link below.

http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/2012/3/8/lawrence-v-bank-of-america-allegations-of-actual-knowledge-o.html

Parens Patriae actions, class actions?

The 9th Circuit holds that parens patriae actions under Nevada law are not class actions removable to federal court under CAFA, adding to a circuit split on the issue.  For a succinct explanation, see Katherine Heckert’s post at the Carlton Fields Class Action Blog:

http://www.carltonfields.com/classactionblog/blog.aspx?entry=521

Walmart v. Dukes reasoning reverses class certification again

Skaddon’s Russell Jackson posts that the Louisiana Supreme Court has again reversed class certification due to problems of commonality and causation.  Previously, the Louisiana high court adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s common question analysis in Walmart v. Dukes to reverse class certification in Price v. Martin.  In a recent per curiam opinion in Alexander v. Norfolk So. Corp., No. 11-C-2793, Slip op. (La. Mar. 9, 2012), the Louisiana Supreme Court cited Price for the proposition that class certification requires a rigorous analysis and significant proof of a common question. The case involved a chemical spill involving train cars. Hundreds complained of a bad smell and irritation to their eyes, throat and nose.  This led to a class action that was certified by the trial court and affirmed by an appellate court.  It turned out, each putative class member would need individual toxicology testing to determine whether they are among the minority of people who are susceptible to very low levels of the released chemical.  The Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately reversed class certification based on the lack of predominance of common issues, and the need for individualized trials.  Read more here.

http://www.consumerclassactionsmasstorts.com/2012/03/articles/predominance-1/once-again-the-louisiana-supremes-reverse-class-certification-citing-causation-as-a-problem/

The Perils of Electronically Stored Information

Todd Dawson’s post on Baker Hostetler’s Employment Class Action Blog illustrates just how badly things can go when a key “smoking Howitzer” document slips through defense counsel’s ESI review and ends up in the plaintiffs’ hands.  In an FLSA Collective Action, the employer produced two million documents. Prior to the production, the employer’s attorneys used various search terms to identify privileged documents.  Inevitably, one got through – a bad one. Even worse, the court concluded that the employer had waived privilege.  Thus, not only did the plaintiffs’ counsel get to see the document, they got to use it as well.  To see how this disaster could have been avoided, read more here.

http://www.employmentclassactionreport.com/flsa/inadvertent-esi-disclosure-of-attorney-client-communication-waives-privilege-in-flsa-collective-acti/

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For those readers who are interested in additional insights on Judge Posner’s opinion in McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 11-3639 (7th Cir., Feb. 24, 2012), which was the subject of Wednesday’s CAB post, here’s a link to an insightful executive alert on the decision, which was authored by colleagues in Baker Hostler’s New York office, partner Deborah Renner and associate Matthew Moody.

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Last Friday, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued a significant employment class action decision that may challenge conventional wisdom about the impact of the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.   The opinion, authored by respected Judge Richard Posner, is McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 11-3639 (7th Cir., Feb. 24, 2012).

The procedural history of McReynolds is interesting, because the plaintiffs had actually moved for reconsideration of an earlier denial of class certification after the decidedly pro-employer decision in Dukes was announced.  Although the trial court judge was unconvinced to change his earlier decision, he did agree that Dukes presented a good basis for reconsideration of the class action issue, and expressly stated in his decision that he believed the case was a good candidate for an interlocutory appeal under Rule 23(f).

The Seventh Circuit accepted the appeal, and reversed the denial of class certification.  The Seventh Circuit panel recognized that individualized issues would prevent certification of any claims for back pay or damages, but held that certification of the issue of whether the defendant’s challenged employment policies had an adverse impact on members of a protected class would still be appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2), which allows a class to be certified for the purpose of awarding injunctive relief, and Rule 23(c)(4), which allows certification of particular issues.  Essentially, the case would be certified for the purpose of deciding whether the defendant’s challenged policies created a disparate impact to members of a protected class and for the purpose of ruling on plaintiffs’ request to enjoin the practices.  Any claims for back pay, compensatory or punitive damages would then have to be brought as separate proceedings. 

In reaching its conclusion, the court drew a key factual distinction between the practices being challenged in the case before it and the practices that had been challenged in Dukes.  In McReynolds, the practice being challenged was the company-wide policy of “permitting brokers to form their own teams and prescribing criteria for account distributions that favor the already successfulthose who may owe heir success to having been invited to join a successful or promising team.”  The court distinguished this policy, which it characterized as a firm-wide policy of Merrill Lynch, from the allegations in Dukes, which were that the lack of a uniform corporate policy on discrimination created too much discretion in local managers to create locally discriminatory policies.

I’ll be posting more on this decision within the coming week, so stay tuned…

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I’m embarrassingly late in posting a link to a terrific article from Steptoe & Johnson Partner Jennifer Quinn-Barabanov entitled Has Dukes Killed Medical Monitoring?  The article, published in the November 2011 Issue of DRI’s For the Defense Magazine, explores the potential impact of the Supreme Court’s decision Dukes in defending against class certification of product liability claims that seek as a remedy medical monitoring of class members who were exposed to an allegedly harmful product.

I highly recommend Quinn-Barabanov’s article for those of you who may have missed it when it came out in November.  The article is a must-read for anyone facing (or prosecuting) a medical monitoring class action.

It also makes at least two key contributions that are independent of the medical monitoring context.  First, it offers an analysis of the potential application of various aspects of the Wal-mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes decision outside of the employment discrimination context, including the arguably heightened commonality analysis and the admissibility of expert testimony in support of class certification.  Second, it is a good primer on the possible distinctions between truly injunctive relief, which still may be the basis for a Rule 23(b)(2) class action, and merely equitable relief incidental to a claim for monetary relief, which the Dukes Court held cannot support class certification under Rule 23(b)(2).

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Ever since the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decisions in Smith v. Bayer and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, I have wondered aloud whether we would start to see a significant divergence between the standards applicable to class certification in the state and federal courts.  (See the Parting Thoughts Section of this August 31 SCOTUSBlog Post).  My home state of Colorado has been the first to end this speculation, adopting a decidedly more liberal standard for class certification in its decision yesterday in Jackson v. Unocal Corp. than the standards discussed in Dukes and many other lower federal court decisions. 

The main holding of the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson can be summarized with the court’s statement that:

A trial court must conduct a rigorous analysis of the evidence and find to its satisfaction that each C.R.C.P. 23 requirement is established.

Jackson, Slip Op. at 18.  At first glance, this statement may not seem out of step with the “rigorous analysis” standard commonly recognized by the federal courts.  However, the majority’s intentional use of the phrase “to its satisfaction” rather than “by a preponderance of the evidence” makes the Colorado standard a potentially far less exacting hurdle.  A large portion of Justice Martinez’s majority opinion is dedicated to explaining why the court chose to make the class certification decision a matter of pure judicial discretion by the trial court rather than a matter of evidentiary proof.  The majority opinion makes reference no less than four times to the state’s “policy of favoring the maintenance of class actions” and juxtaposes this policy against a federal policy that the majority characterizes as “limiting class actions.” 

Also key to the majority’s analysis was the language of Colorado’s rule 23 allowing the court to make a “conditional” class certification order, language that has recently been removed from the federal rule.  Because certification can be tentatively granted and later revoked by the trial court in Colorado, the court reasoned, the applicable evidentiary standard should be more flexible and less definitive than the “preponderance” of the evidence standard applied in most federal courts, where (the Jackson court reasoned) the rule requires a single class certification decision.

The majority addressed two other issues that are closely related to the standard of review.  The first was whether a trial court may resolve factual disputes that overlap with the merits of the case.  On that issue, the majority reached the relatively uncontroversial conclusion that a court may consider disputes about facts that overlap with the merits, but “only to the extent necessary to satisfy itself that the requirements of C.R.C.P. 23 have been met.”  Slip op. at 27.   

The second issue was whether the trial court should resolve expert witness disputes in reaching its determination on class certification.  On this issue, the court’s holding was nuanced.  Although it recognized that the trial court must evaluate the competing experts’ opinions in order to determine whether the evidence at trial can be presented in a way to resolve the class claims through a common set of facts, the majority held that a trial court should not rule on the admissibility of the plaintiffs’ expert’s testimony at the class certification phase.  The majority again recognized that this holding was contrary to the holdings of several federal court decisions, but it reasoned that a different standard was justified under the Colorado rule because a trial court had the power to reconsider a preliminary certification order following a pretrial Shreck (the Colorado equivalent of Daubert, not to be confused with Shrek, the surly but loveable ogre) hearing on the admissibility of a plaintiffs’ expert’s testimony.  See id. at 31-32.

A strongly-worded dissent from Justice Eid, who was joined by Justice Rice, criticized the decision by stating, in summary, that:

the majority’s standardless approach makes class certification in Colorado essentially unreviewable by appellate courts and raises serious procedural due process concerns.

Slip Op. at 1 (Eid, J., dissenting).  Justice Eid’s dissent contains a wealth ammunition for academics, commentators, and the courts of other jurisdictions to question the majority’s reasoning.  But alas, for litigants in Colorado, it does not have the force of law.  So, rather than discuss it in depth, I simply commend it to your reading.

There are a host of questions that arise out of Jackson that will likely be the subject of future litigation in the Colorado courts, and I’ll address a few of them now.  However, I’ll apply the Colorado Supreme Court’s class certification standard to the following remarks by saying that they are preliminary and tentative and subject to later reconsideration as the record develops.

Does the Jackson decision mean that trial courts in Colorado should take a “certify first, ask questions later” approach to the certification question?  

This is a position that any party seeking class certification will likely take in the wake of Jackson.  However, a review of all four companion cases decided by the Colorado Supreme Court on Monday makes clear that this is not a permissible approach.  Jackson vests wide discretion in the trial court to grant or deny certification depending on whether the class certification elements are met to the court’s satisfaction, but it also requires the trial court to consider evidence presented by both sides in analyzing whether class treatment is appropriate.  These conclusions are reflected by the results in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Reyher, in which the court applied its new standard and held that a trial court had acted within its discretion in denying class certification after a rigorous analysis, and Garcia v. Medved Chevrolet, Inc., in which it determined that the trial court had erred by granting class certification without taking into consideration the evidence presented by the defendant showing that individual questions would predominate.

Is the “rigorous analysis” standard meaningless in light of the trial court’s vast discretion under Jackson?

 Justice Eid’s dissent argues that the majority’s decision renders the “rigorous analysis” requirement a purely procedural requirement.  In other words, as long as the trial court goes through all the motions, the court still has relatively unfettered discretion to grant or deny certification.  This may be true as an analytical matter, but as a practical matter, performing the “rigorous analysis” requires the trial judge to think critically about how the trial is actually going to be conducted.  It also prevents the trial judge from glossing over what may turn out to be insurmountable practical problems in fairly adjudicating the case through common, class-wide evidence.  Thus, even if a “rigorous analysis” is a purely procedural requirement, that does not mean that it will have no impact on the outcome of class certification motions.

Has the Colorado Supreme Court resurrected the pre-Dukes misinterpretation of Eisen as prohibiting any analysis of the merits of the case?

That the answer to this question is no may not be completely clear from the majority’s opinion in Jackson itself, but it becomes clear when Jackson is read in combination with Justice Martinez’s companion opinion in Reyher.  While, curiously, the majority opinion in Jackson makes no reference to Dukes, the opinion in Reyher cites Dukes approvingly in holding that a trial court cannot simply accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true.  The line that can’t be crossed is that the trial court cannot prejudge the merits, a conclusion that is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.

Is class certification now effectively unreviewable in the Colorado appellate courts?

The widely disparate outcomes in the three companion cases decided along with Jackson reflect that appellate review will still have a function after Jackson.  An appellate court may clearly find 1) that the trial court conducted a rigorous analysis of the evidence and acted within its discretion in either granting (Jackson, Patterson) or denying (Reyher) class certification; or 2) that the trial court failed to conduct a rigorous analysis of the evidence and therefore the case must be remanded (Garcia).   What is less clear is whether there ever going to be circumstances in which an appellate court could find that a trial court performed a rigorous analysis but abused its discretion in deciding the outcome of the class certification motion, and whether, if so, the appellate court could dictate the result of the class certification motion rather than remanding that decision to the trial court.

What are the practical implications of Jackson?

There many potential practical implications of the Jackson decision.  First, the standard in Colorado is clearly less stringent than the federal court standard.  This raises the prospect that plaintiffs will view Colorado as a favorable forum for class action litigation, and it will almost certainly raise the stakes in battles over forum selection and federal jurisdiction.  Moreover, given the trial court judge’s broad discretion over the class certification, the particular leanings and predispositions of the trial court judge become pivotal in the likely success or failure of a class action.

Second, the court’s emphasis on the tentative nature of class certification decisions under Colorado Rule 23 means that even once they are certified, class actions in Colorado are likely to be subjected to repeated efforts at decertification as the case progresses.

Third, the emphasis on the “rigorous analysis” standard increases the likelihood that, despite the lack of a clear standard for resolving the issue, class certification will necessitate a mini-trial involving the presentation of live witnesses and a fully-developed record, likely increasing the cost of discovery and the class certification process itself.

On the other hand, none of these potential impacts would be a drastic change from the way that class actions are already being litigated in the Colorado Courts.  Parties already fight over removal and forum selection, courts already conduct evidentiary hearings on class certification motions, and defendants already make repeated efforts at decertifying a class.  Thus, the legacy of  Jackson may ultimately be merely to validate the existing customs and practices for litigating  class actions in Colorado.

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I was not able to attend the ABA National Institute on Class Actions program in New York City last week, but class action notice expert and occasional CAB contributor, Dr. Shannon R. Wheatman, Vice President, Kinsella Media (swheatman@kinsellamedia.com), was there and she graciously agreed to send me her notes of what sounds like another great conference. Shannon was a fitting correspondent this year because three federal court judges talked about the need for plain language class action notice, which also happens to be the topic of Shannon’s doctoral dissertation. Shannon’s notes follow below. – PGK

Notes from the 15th Annual National Institute on Class Actions (New York City)

Following an energetic introduction from Goldman Scarlato Karon & Penny partner Dan Karon, Columbia Law Professor John C. Coffee kicked things off with his annual review of developments in federal class action law. He focused on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent class action decisions. He noted, “The landscape has changed – and changed dramatically – this year.”

Prof. Coffee began his discussion with the impact of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). He noted three distinct messages in that decision: (1) a new standard for commonality, (2) individualized money damages are not available under 23(b)(2), and (3) affirmative defenses must receive individualized hearings. Prof. Coffee said the new commonality standard would have the greatest impact on 23(b)(2) classes including employment and environmental litigation. Affirmative defenses will be used by defendants to show that the class is unmanageable or that it fails the predominance requirement. Prof. Coffee provided some ways to get around affirmative defenses: (1) raise a Twombly/Iqbal challenge to affirmative defenses that are not pled with enough specificity to satisfy the “plausibility” standard, (2) seek only partial certification and leave affirmative defenses to be resolved in individual actions, and (3) concede that defendants can raise an affirmative defense, but deny that it can be raised to a jury.

Prof. Coffee discussed dueling class actions and the ruling in Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011), which held that the relitigation exception did not permit a federal court to enjoin a class from seeking certification in a West Virginia state court. Basically, Prof. Coffee said, the Court ruled that the benefit of the doubt must go to the state court; a federal court lacks power to bind non-parties, such as absent class members.

The discussion turned to AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). The Supreme Court’s majority found that state law rules are preempted when they obstruct the Federal Arbitration Agreement’s objectives. Prof. Coffee believes mandatory arbitration clauses will be making their way into more employment contracts.

Highlights of panel discussions

The Practice that Never Sleeps: Reexamining the Class Action Practice and Considering Where It – Indeed, We – Go from Here

This panel (Dan Karon, Judge Colleen McMahon, Judge Benita Y. Pearson, Professor Brian T. Fitzpatrick, J. Philip Cabrese, Derek G. Howard, and Peter M. Ryan) provided a discussion of the state of affairs in class actions. Dan Karon asked the panel “What’s with all of the hostility?” Prof. Fitzpatrick believes it comes from a misperception based entirely upon the outliers that give class actions a bad name. Prof. Fitzpatrick conducted an empirical study of fee awards (filed from 2006-2007) in over 700 cases. He found the average fee award was 15%. So, the “perception that lawyers are getting everything and class members are getting nothing is not true.”

Derrick Howard stated that it is fiction that most class actions are frivolous. The risk of bringing a class action on a contingent basis is substantial. Class action attorneys, he said, are acting as private attorneys general to correct wrongs. It was noted that the DOJ is closing half its antitrust field offices. How will that effect enforcement? Class action attorneys have to be the enforcers.

Judge McMahon, from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, said, “Don’t endow us with superhuman powers.” Most class actions are settled with little opposition, she said. Judges cannot “intuit” that something is wrong if no one speaks up. Judge Pearson, from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, said it is important to allow enough time for objectors and intervenors to know and respond in some way to proposed settlements.

This is where things got interesting. Larry Schonbrun, a self-proclaimed professional objector, stood up and told the panel that the court should appoint a class guardian to ensure a settlement is fair and reasonable. Judge McMahon replied, “Who pays for that?” The panel agreed that this would cause a substitution of judgment that was not necessary or even helpful. Schonbrun went on to say that the court has the power to find out if the settlement is unfair but the court chooses not to exercise that power.

Judge Pearson disagreed with Schonbrun and remarked that because a settlement is hard-fought does not mean it is fair and just. She requires the parties to walk her through the terms of the settlement. She also wants to talk with the class representatives.

The content and design of class action notices were discussed. Judge Pearson said she always wants to see what a notice will look like when printed to ensure it is readable. Judge McMahon went on to note that writing a notice is like crafting jury instructions. She told attorneys that they “have to work hard to make it readable” and they “have to work hard to make it comprehensible.” One audience member remarked that there are plain language notice experts who can help attorneys.

Judge Pearson talked about proper deliverability of notice. She said debt collectors can find people and that it can be done without extraordinary costs and time. She seemed to be intimating that some class action notices remain undelivered and that there must be ways to get better addresses.

One attorney on the panel said that when Twombly was decided, everyone thought it was the death knell for class actions. Instead, there was a leveling effect as people adjusted. There is a temptation to interpret Supreme Court decisions as the final word but, as one attorney noted, “A 5-4 decision is not a death knell of anything.” Lawyers are very creative and will find a way to deal with Wal-Mart and Concepcion.

The Empire Cases – AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes from Those Who Made Them Happen”

This panel was comprised of the lawyers involved in Concepcion (F. Paul Bland, Jr. and Andrew J. Pincus) and Wal-Mart (Mark A. Perry and Joseph M. Sellers). Fred Burnside expertly moderated this session. Paul Bland would have liked to see a different case go up for review. There was no factual record in Concepcion because of the categorical rule of evidence set forth in the Discover Bank case.

The panel discussed the net effect of Concepcion. Basically, Concepcion does not require enforcement of a class action ban even when the evidence shows that the plaintiffs could not effectively vindicate their statutory rights in individual arbitration. Fred Burnside said that the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) has to post results. He found more than 100 instances where people arbitrated for less than $100. So, some people appear to be using arbitration to vindicate their rights. However, it was later revealed that there have only been 1,300 AAA claims in the past year.

Joe Sellers began the discussion on Wal-Mart. He remarked that he fielded 74 questions during oral argument and that the defense, led by Mark Perry, received far fewer. He was most surprised that Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor were skeptical of the use of formulas for determining back pay even though they have been used for 35 years. The Court disregarded statistical evidence when it failed to find that a specific employment practice tied together 1.5 million class members. The question was raised whether Daubert applies to expert opinions offered at class certification. Sellers said, “The Court did not decide whether Daubert applies to class certification, although in dictum it suggested” it did.

Melee in Manhattan! Class Action Objectors – Are They Protectors of Absent Class Members or Merely Gadflies?

This was the most highly anticipated panel. Vincent J. Esades put together a panel that included Nancy F. Atlas, from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas and three professional (Ed. Note-see Mr. Frank’s comment below distinguishing his role from that of a “professional objector as that term is often used) objectors (Ted Frank, Darrell Palmer, and Lawrence W. Schonbrun). The crowd followed Dan Karon’s earlier admonition “to not throw chairs,” but the discussion was heated at times.

Judge Atlas said that most judges care enormously about absent class members and protecting the process. She agreed that there are good objections that help fine-tune a settlement by pointing out substantive issues. However, she said, there are a lot of bad objections as well that do not serve to point out any real issues with the settlement. Larry Schonbrun was the most vocal about blaming attorneys for excessive fees and judges for doing a “miserable job in approving fees” just to get the case off the docket. Schonbrun said he doesn’t believe that courts want to hear objections. Darrell Palmer disagreed.

Ted Frank said that he goes after the worst settlements. Palmer said the system falls short because class counsel does not make sure class members know what is going on or how to file a claim. Frank, who often objects to attorneys’ fees, said fees should be based on the amount actually distributed to class members.

Larry Schonbrun revealed that he had been an attorney in one class action but has offered over 150 objections. He fervently believes objections should be raised in every settlement. Darrell Palmer told the crowd that “objecting is a hobby for me.”

Judge Atlas echoed Judges McMahon and Pearson by saying that class action notices need to be “legible and comprehensible to laypersons.” She talked about having a good headline and writing in plain English.

The matter of cy pres awards was raised. Ted Frank said settlement monies should go to the class and not to favorite charities chosen by attorneys or judges.

An audience member asked the objectors how much each of them has accepted to sell appeals over the last decade. Ted Frank said “none,” Darrell Palmer said “a lot,” and Larry Schonbrun declined to answer. Darrell Palmer said the way to stop this practice is to stop paying off objectors. The professional objectors revealed that most objections address attorneys’ fees and poorly written notices.

If I Can Make It There, I Can Make It Anywhere: Lessons Learned from Class Action Trials for the Rest of Us

This panel (Andrew J. McGuinness, Judge Jack Weinstein, James Donato, David Sanford, Edmund W. Searby, and Thomas M. Sobol) discussed preparing for a class action trial. There really are not many differences between a class action and a very complex individual trial. The rules of evidence are the same and Rule 23 does not deal with trials – only with the notice requirements for certification. The panel discussed that jury members may not even know what a class action means. Judge Weinstein, from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, spoke of the importance of the charge to the jury. Judge Weinstein said he allows more leeway in jury voir dire in class action trials. If the evidence will involve a lot of statistics, he wants to have someone on the jury who will lead the other jurors to understand. Tom Sobol said he likes to come out first with the defense witnesses in order to tell the story to the jury. Jim Donato said the “victory is in the details.” He allowed jurors in one of his cases to ask questions at any time during the trial. Judge Weinstein said he has never allowed unfiltered questions because the risk of mistrial “frightens me.” Edmund Searby said it is best to get class representatives on and off the witness stand as quickly as possible to avoid any damage. The key, he said, is to have a class representative who is likable and credible.

New Kid on the Block – The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: What Is It, How Will It Work, and How Will It Affect Us?

The final panel examined the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”). This panel was moderated by Jeffrey A. Leon and included a representative from the CFPB (David M. Gossett); James D. Kole, who practices with the Illinois Attorney General’s Office; defense attorney, Michael Thurman; and plaintiffs’ attorney, Jonathan D. Selbin.

David Gossett provided an overview of the CFPB. The agency is in limbo until a director can be named. The CFPB will be working closely with the FTC on joint regulations. The CFPB will have broader rulemaking powers since it (unlike the FTC) can actually write regulations. Gossett asked any attorney trying to reach a settlement on the same claims as an enforcement action to reach out to the CFPB. He also talked about CAFA notice and how the CFPB will need to be noticed (specific guidelines will be set out in the future). A study on mandatory arbitration clauses will be undertaken before the CFPB considers the propriety of banning them.

Michael Thurman stated that defendants will be happy to learn that the FTC and CFPB will not initiate separate enforcement actions. He also thinks the CFPB’s enhanced rulemaking power is good because it will lay out specific rules for businesses. James Kole said the Illinois Attorney General is viewing the CFPB as a positive force in the realm of consumer fraud protection. Jonathan Selbin asked some key questions on how the CFPB could impact class actions, including the possibility of preemption, exhaustion requirements, discovery and document production, and whether the CFPB can release class claims. He raised the concern that potential settlement with the CFPB could create a reverse auction atmosphere for defendants.

Save the date – 16th Annual National Institute on Class Actions – October 11, 2012 – Washington, DC

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